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ADAPTIVE  DYNAMICS  IN COORDINATION  GAMES 
BY VINCENT  P. CRAWFORD1 
This paper proposes  a model of the process by which players learn to play repeated 
coordination  games, with  the  goal of  understanding the  results of  some  recent  experi- 
ments. In those  experiments the dynamics of subjects' strategy choices  and the resulting 
patterns of discrimination among equilibria varied systematically with the rule for deter- 
mining payoffs and the  size  of  the  interacting groups, in ways that  are not  adequately 
explained by available methods of analysis. The model suggests a possible explanation by 
showing  how  the  dispersion  of  subjects' beliefs  interacts with  the  learning process  to 
determine the probability distribution of its dynamics and limiting outcome. 
KEYwORDS:  Equilibrium selection,  coordination, learning, strategic uncertainty. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IN ECONOMICS, COORDINATION PROBLEMS are usually modeled as noncooperative 
games with multiple Nash equilibria in which any Pareto-efficient  strategy 
combination  is an equilibrium,  but players'  strategy  choices are optimal only 
when they are based on sufficiently  similar  beliefs about how the game will be 
played.  Although  such games have no incentive  problems  as these are normally 
characterized,  playing  them often involves  real difficulties.  Similar  difficulties  lie 
at the heart of many questions usually analyzed under the assumption  that 
players  can coordinate  on any desired  equilibrium.  These include  how incentive 
schemes should be structured;  which outcomes can be supported  by implicit 
contract in a long-term  relationship;  whether, and how, bargainers  share the 
surplus  from making  an agreement;  and the role of expectations  in macroeco- 
nomics. 
Convincing  answers  to such questions  must go beyond  the observation  that if 
rational  players  have commonly  known,  identical  beliefs, then those beliefs must 
be  consistent with some equilibrium  in the game. However, the traditional 
approach  to analyzing  games with multiple equilibria  relies on refining  Nash's 
notion of equilibrium  until (ideally) only one survives,  and traditional  refine- 
ments do not accomplish  this for coordination  games.  This suggests  that players 
are unlikely  to base their decisions  entirely  on deductions  from rationality,  and 
highlights  the importance  of gathering  information  from other sources about 
how coordination  problems  are solved. 
1I  am grateful to Brian Arthur, Antonio  Cabrales, John Conlisk, Robert Engle,  Daniel  Fried- 
man,  Clive  Granger,  Jerry Hausman,  Yong-Gwan  Kim,  Mark  Machina,  Robert  Porter,  Garey 
Ramey, Michael Rothschild, Larry Samuelson, Joel  Sobel, Maxwell Stinchcombe, Glenn Sueyoshi, 
John Van Huyck, Halbert White, Peyton Young, and anonymous referees for helpful suggestions; to 
Bruno  Broseta  and  Pu  Shen  for  valuable  advice  and  outstanding  research  assistance;  to  Ray 
Battalio, Richard Beil, and John Van Huyck for access to their experimental data; to the Santa Fe 
Institute  and  the  Department  of  Economics,  University  of  Canterbury (New  Zealand)  for  their, 
hospitality; and to the National Science Foundation for research support. 
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Perhaps  the most important  source of such information  now available  is the 
rapidly  growing  experimental  literature  on coordination.  A number  of recent 
-studies-such as Banks, Plott, and Porter (1988); Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, 
and Ross (1990); Isaac, Schmidtz,  and Walker  (1989); Roth and Schoumaker 
(1983);  and  Van  Huyck,  Battalio,  and  Beil  (1990,  1991)  (henceforth 
"VHBB")-report  experiments in which subjects repeatedly played simple 
coordination  games, uncertain  in most cases only about each other's strategy 
choices. The results suggest that players' initial beliefs in  such games are 
normally  widely dispersed; that this dispersion, which I  shall call  strategic 
uncertainty, makes players' experience with analogous games an important 
determinant  of their decisions;  and that interactions  between strategic  uncer- 
tainty  and the process  of learning  from  experience  can exert  a strong  and lasting 
influence  on coordination  outcomes. 
The effects  of strategic  uncertainty  show  up especially  clearly  in VHBB (1990, 
1991).  The large strategy  spaces and the variety  of modes of interaction  in their 
designs  yielded remarkably  rich dynamics,  with persistent  patterns  of discrimi- 
nation among equilibria  emerging  over time. These patterns  varied systemati- 
cally with the  environment,  in ways that are not  adequately explained by 
available  methods of analysis  but which can be better understood,  as I shall 
argue,  by taking  strategic  uncertainty  fully into account. 
This paper presents a simple model of the learning  process that suggests a 
unified explanation of  the  dynamics and patterns of  discrimination  VHBB 
observed.  The model is a repeated  game in which  players  adjust  their strategies 
in the underlying  coordination  game in response  to their experience.  It implies 
that players  normally  converge  to some equilibrium  in the underlying  game, as 
usually happens in coordination experiments.  The question remains, which 
equilibrium?  The model answers  this question  by showing  how strategic  uncer- 
tainty interacts  with the learning process to determine the prior probability 
distribution  of its outcome. When players'  beliefs are identical  from the start, 
the outcome is completely  determined  by their initial responses  to the underly- 
ing coordination  game, and does not vary  with the environment  except as their 
initial responses  do. But for realistic  levels of strategic  uncertainty,  declining  at 
realistic rates as players learn to predict how the game will be played, the 
distribution  of the dynamics  and limiting  outcome varies  with the environment 
much as it did in the experiments. 
The model's predictions  are influenced  (but not completely  determined)  by 
the differences  in the sizes of the basins of attraction  of the equilibria  in these 
environments  discussed  in Crawford  (1991). Maynard  Smith's  (1982) notion of 
evolutionary  stability,  Harsanyi  and Selten's (1988) risk-dominance  axiom,  and 
the techniques  used by Kandori,  Mailath,  and Rob (1993) and Young  (1993a)  to 
study the limiting outcomes of related adjustment  processes also respond to 
those size differences,  discriminating  among equilibria  in ways that in some 
respects resemble the patterns VHBB observed. The extent to which these 
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The model departs from traditional  noncooperative  game theory in three 
main ways. First,  players'  behavior  is adaptive  rather  than rational,  in that they 
view their strategies in the underlying  coordination  game as the objects of 
choice, adjusting  them over time in ways that are sensible but not necessarily 
consistent with equilibrium  in the repeated game that describes the  entire 
adjustment  process or the underlying  game.2 One could conduct a traditional 
equilibrium  analysis  of the repeated  game,  but such an analysis  would share the 
indeterminacy  of the underlying  game but nonetheless require  the assumption 
that players'  beliefs are coordinated  when play  begins.  This begs the question  of 
how coordination comes about, and often leads in practice to  dictating a 
solution by applying  refinements  that are largely  insensitive  to the difficulty  of 
coordination.  It seems better for my purposes  to allow players'  beliefs to differ 
and study  the dynamics  of the process  by which they converge. 
Second, the model relies on simplifying  assumptions  about the structure  of 
the  strategic environment  in  the spirit of  evolutionary  game theory. These 
assumptions  are satisfied by VHBB's designs (see Crawford  (1991)) and are 
common  to a number  of interesting  economic  models (see Woodford  (1990) and 
Cooper and John (1988)). They allow a  more informative analysis of  the 
implications  of strategic  uncertainty  than now seems possible for more general 
games.  The results  are applicable  to some important  questions,  and the methods 
seem likely to be useful in other settings. 
Finally, instead of fully endogenizing  players' beliefs and strategy choices 
(whose differences  cannot be traced to differences  in players'  information  or 
other characteristics)  the model characterizes  them statistically,  treating  certain 
aspects of the process that describes  how they evolye as exogenous  parameters 
to be estimated  on a case-by-case  basis. This departure  reflects the conviction, 
first expressed  by Schelling  (1960),  that it is impossible  to predict  from rational- 
ity alone how people will respond to coordination  problems. I illustrate the 
usefulness of this approach  by using the data from VHBB's experiments  to 
estimate the model, treating  the idiosyncratic  components  of players'  beliefs as 
error  terms, and then using the estimates  to infer the prior  probability  distribu- 
tions of outcomes  in the various  environments.  In each case the model provides 
an adequate  statistical  summary  of subjects'  behavior  while closely reproducing 
the dynamics  of their interactions.  The distributions  it implies suggest  that the 
observed dynamics  are not anomalous,  but in some cases they strengthen  or 
modify  the impressions  created  by the raw data. 
The paper is  organized as follows. Section 2  introduces the model and 
summarizes  VHBB's experimental  designs and results. Sections 3 and 4 carry 
out an analysis under the simplifying  assumption  that players' strategies are 
continuously  variable.  Section  5 extends  the analysis  to the case in which  players 
2Because  players' strategy choices normally converge to an equilibrium in the underlying game, 
this  "irrationality" does  not  persist,  and  is  therefore  immune  to  the  most  common  criticism of 
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have discrete, finite strategy  spaces, as in the experiments.  Section 6 reports 
econometric  estimates  of the model's  parameters  based on VHBB's experimen- 
tal data, and Section 7 discusses the implications  of these estimates for the 
probability  distributions  of coordination  outcomes. 
2.  VAN  HUYCK,  BAII7ALIO,  AND  BEIL'S  EXPERIMENTAL  DESIGNS  AND  RESULTS 
In VHBB's  (1990, 1991)  experiments,  subjects  repeatedly  played  coordination 
games in which their payoffs were determined by their own strategies and 
simple summary  statistics  of other players'  strategies.  Explicit communication 
was not allowed, but the relevant summary  statistic was publicly announced 
after each play. (In some experiments  entire strategy  profiles were also an- 
nounced;  this made little difference  to the results.)  With apparently  unimpor- 
tant exceptions,  all details of the structure  of each experimental  environment 
were publicly announced at the  start. There was ample evidence that the 
subjects  understood  the rules and were paid well enough to induce the desired 
preferences.3 
VHBB's designs  are best understood  in simplified  versions  of the games  used 
in their 1990 experiments.  Suppose that a number  of players  choose between 
two efforts,  1 and 2. The minimum  of their efforts  determines  their total output, 
which they share equally.  Effort is costly, but sufficiently  productive  that if all 
players  choose the same effort their output shares  more than repay  their costs. 
If anyone  shirks,  however,  the balance  of the others'  efforts  is wasted.  Assuming 
for definiteness  that output per capita is twice the minimum  effort and each 
player's  unit effort cost is 1, payoffs  are determined  as follows: 
Minimum Effort 
2  1 
2  2  0 
Player's 
Effort  1  1 
A game with this structure  was suggested  by Bryant  (1983) (see also Cooper 
and John (1988))  as a model of Keynesian  effective  demand  failures.  This game 
has a long history  in economics,  which can be traced to the stag hunt example 
Rousseau  (1973 (1775),  p. 78) used to discuss  the origins  of the social contract. 
To  see  the  connection, imagine (adding some  game-theoretic detail  to 
Rousseau's  discussion)  that each of a number  of hunters must independently 
decide whether  to join in a stag hunt (effort  2) or hunt rabbits  by himself  (effort 
1). Hunting  a stag yields each hunter  a payoff  of 2 when successful,  but success 
requires  the cooperation  of every hunter and failure  yields 0. Hunting rabbits 
yields each hunter a payoff of  1 with or without cooperation, and thereby 
determines  the opportunity  cost of effort devoted to the stag hunt. 
3VHBB  (1990, 1991) and Crawford (1991) describe the designs in more detail. COORDINATION  GAMES  107 
For any number  of players,  stag hunt has two pure-strategy  Nash equilibria, 
one with all choosing effort 2 and one with all choosing effort 1. The effort-2 
equilibrium  is the best feasible outcome for all players,  and all strictly  prefer it 
to the effort-1  equilibrium.  This rationale  for playing  effort 2 does not depend 
on game-theoretic  subtleties;  it is clearly  the "correct"  coordinating  principle. 
However,  effort 2's higher  payoff  when all players  choose it must be traded  off 
against  its risk  of a lower payoff  when someone does not. For a player  to prefer 
effort 2 (treating  the influence  of his choice on future developments  as negligi- 
ble) he must  believe that the correctness  of this choice is sufficiently  clear that it 
is  more likely than not  that all of  the  other players will believe that its 
correctness  is sufficiently  clear to all. Informal  experiments  suggest  that people 
are often uncertain  about  whether  other people will believe this, and that most 
people accordingly  believe that effort 2 is a good bet in small groups  but not in 
large groups.4 
VHBB's experiments  showed  that this kind of uncertainty  can have profound 
and lasting consequences.  Their subjects  chose among seven efforts instead of 
two, with both the summary  statistic  used to determine  payoffs  and the size of 
the groups playing the game varying across treatments. In the "minimum" 
experiments  reported  in VHBB (1990)  populations  of 14-16 subjects  repeatedly 
played  games  like stag hunt,  first  in large groups  with the minimum  effort  in the 
entire population determining  payoffs, and then in random pairs with each 
subject's  payoff determined  by his current  pair's minimum.5  In the "median" 
experiments  reported  in VHBB (1991) populations  of nine subjects  repeatedly 
played games in which the entire population's  median effort determined  their 
payoffs,  with variations  in the payoff  function across three treatments.  In each 
case the game had the "same"  seven strict,  symmetric,  pure-strategy  equilibria; 
this similarity  in strategic  structure  extends to the experimental  environments 
when the random-pairing  treatment  is viewed as a game played simultaneously 
by all members of the population, with players' expected payoffs evaluated 
before the uncertainty  of pairing  is resolved. 
These environments  elicited roughly  similar  initial  distributions  of effort,  with 
high to moderate  means and variances.  Subjects'  subsequent  behavior,  however, 
differed strikingly  and systematically  across treatments,  with consequences  for 
equilibrium  selection that appeared  likely to persist indefinitely.  In the large- 
group minimum treatment subjects' choices gravitated strongly toward the 
4Note  that  these  beliefs  are  self-confirming.  They  are  plausible  because  if  players  choose 
independently, with probabilities independent  of the number of players, the clarity of the principle 
is less likely to be sufficient the larger the group. Because  this intuition concerns a choice between 
strict equilibria, however, it is not captured by traditional refinements like trembling-hand perfect- 
ness or strategic stability. 
5 In the random-pairing treatment each subject was told only his current pair's minimum. There 
was also a treatment in which the minimum game was repeatedly played by fixed pairs, with subjects 
informed that their pairings were fixed. Those  subjects were evidently aware of the importance of 
repeated-game  strategies,  and  usually  achieved  efficient  coordination.  Because  repeated-game 
strategies raise difficult new issues-the  horizon over which players evaluate their strategies, for one 
-that  treatment  is  not  discussed  here.  It  may be  possible  to  explain its  results  along  the  lines 
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lowest effort,  even though  this led to the least efficient  equilibrium.  By contrast, 
in  the  random-pairing  minimum treatment subjects' efforts converged very 
slowly  with little or no trend; and in the median treatments  subjects  invariably 
converged  to the equilibrium  determined  by the initial median, even though it 
varied across runs in each treatment and was usually inefficient.6  Thus, the 
dynamics were highly sensitive to  group size, with very different rates of 
convergence  and patterns of discrimination  among equilibria  in the random- 
pairing  and large-group  minimum  treatments.  They  were also highly  sensitive  to 
the summary  statistic  used to determine  payoffs,  with no trends and very strong 
history-dependence  in the median treatments  but strong  trends and no history- 
dependence  in the large-group  minimum  treatment. 
The similarity  of the distributions  of subjects'  initial responses across treat- 
ments suggests that the differences in their subsequent  behavior can be  at- 
tributed to the dynamics  of the learning process. Explaining  VHBB's results 
requires  imposing  structure  on this process.  Many  structures  are consistent  with 
some aspects of the results, and the dynamics  will be at least as important  as 
their limiting  outcomes in discriminating  among explanations.  It is instructive, 
however,  to consider  the extent to which  the outcomes  that emerged  (or seemed 
to be emerging)  in the experiments  can be explained  by applying  equilibrium 
refinements  to the underlying  coordination  games.7 
Traditional  refinements  like trembling-hand  perfectness  and strategic  stability 
do not address  the strategic  issues raised  by VHBB's games.  Those refinements 
are motivated by asking whether a given equilibrium  is self-enforcing  if  all 
players  expect it to govern  play. They therefore  do not discriminate  among  the 
strict equilibria  in these games, which all pose essentially the same strategic 
question in the absence of strategic  uncertainty. 
More promising  are refinements  like Harsanyi  and Selten's (1988) risk-domi- 
nance axiom or the "general  theory of equilibrium  selection" of which it is a 
part, which do discriminate  between strict equilibria.  Although Harsanyi  and 
Selten assume that players'  beliefs always  converge  to a particular  equilibrium 
before play begins, the mental tatonnements that model their convergence 
process are sensitive to strategic  uncertainty,  with implications  for equilibrium 
selection that are similar in some respects to the patterns VHBB observed. 
However,  neither  Harsanyi  and Selten's  theory  nor a variant  that eliminates  the 
precedence  they give payoff-dominance  (allowing  risk-dominance,  which  embod- 
ies most of their ideas about the effects of strategic  uncertainty,  to determine 
the outcome  in most of VHBB's  treatments)  corresponds  very  closely  to VHBB's 
6 Isaac,  Schmidtz,  and  Walker (1989)  and  several  more  recent  studies  report  similar results. 
Comparing  the  results  across  VHBB's  (1990)  treatments  that  differed  only  in  subjects'  prior 
experience  suggests  that  the  patterns  they  observed  are  not  eliminated  when  subjects  learn  to 
anticipate them; if anything, they are reinforced. 
7Applying  refinements to the repeated game that describes the entire learning process does not 
increase their explanatory power, and seems less plausible in this setting. COORDINATION  CGAMES  109 
subjects'  strategy  choices.8  As will be seen, this is due mainly  to the influence 
strategic  uncertainty  exerts on the learning  dynamics,  an influence  their theory 
rules out by assumption. 
Also  more promising is  Maynard Smith's (1982) notion of  evolutionary 
stability.  Formally  a static equilibrium  refinement,  it is motivated  by considering 
conditions for local stability of  evolutionary  dynamics  that resemble simple 
models of the learning dynamics  (see Crawford  (1989)). Crawford  (1991) ex- 
plored the  possibility of  an "evolutionary"  explanation of  VHBB's results, 
verifying  that VHBB's environments  satisfy  the structural  assumptions  of evolu- 
tionary game theory, so  that the  notion of  evolutionary  stability, suitably 
generalized to  allow finite populations and interactions other than random 
pairing,  can be applied.  Like risk-dominance,  evolutionary  stability  responds  to 
the large differences in the sizes of basins of  attraction in the large-group 
minimum treatment by discriminating  among strict equilibria  in a way that 
resembles VHBB's results. Although suggestive,  an analysis  along these lines 
does not determine players' initial strategy  choices, as would be required to 
determine the patterns of equilibrium  selection in VHBB's other treatments, 
and the analogy between evolution and learning may well be  unreliable in 
environments  with strategic uncertainty.  The structure  of evolutionary  games 
nevertheless has important advantages in  modeling the  learning dynamics. 
Section 3 introduces  a model that combines  this structure  with a flexible  model 
of individual  strategy adjustment,  in which players learn from experience in 
comparatively  sophisticated  ways. 
3.  A MODEL  WITH  CONTINUOUSLY  VARIABLE  STRATEGIES. 
In this section and the next it is assumed that players'  pure strategies are 
continuously  variable.  The analysis  resolves most of the issues that arise when 
the model is extended  to the discrete  strategy  spaces of VHBB's experiments  in 
Sections  5-7. 
8As  explained  in  Crawford (1991),  Harsanyi  and  Selten's  theory selects  the  equilibrium with 
effort 7 (in response  to payoff-dominance) in all of VHBB's  treatments but median treatment  P, 
where it selects the equilibrium with effort 4 (in response to symmetry). These selections correspond 
to 7% of subjects' last-period choices in the large-group minimum treatment, 43% in the random- 
pairing minimum treatment,  and 0%, 67%, and 33% in median  treatments  F, Q2,  and  '.  These 
success  rates  are  mostly better  than random, which with  seven  effort levels would  imply a  14% 
success rate, but low. Harsanyi and Selten's theory without payoff-dominance selects the equilibrium 
with effort 1 in the large-group minimum treatment (in response to risk-dominance); the equilibrium 
with  effort  4  in  the  random-pairing minimum  treatment  (because  risk-dominance  is  neutral  in 
VHBB's  two-person minimum game  and the  theory therefore  applies  the  tracing procedure  to  a 
uniform prior over the undominated strategies); the equilibrium with effort 7 in median treatments 
F and 12 (in response to risk-dominance); and the equilibrium with effort 4 in median treatment  P 
(in response to risk-dominance, after imposing symmetry). This raises the success rate to 72% in the 
large-group minimum treatment, lowers it to  17% in the random-pairing minimum treatment, and 
leaves  it unchanged in the median treatments. These  success rates are again better  than random, 
but low. The patterns differ for first-period choices, but the success rates are no higher on average. 110  VINCENT  P.  CRAWFORD 
The model is  defined for a  class of  environments  with the  structure of 
evolutionary  games,  which generalizes  VHBB's  experimental  designs.  There is a 
finite number  of indistinguishable  players,  who repeatedly  play a game in which 
their roles are symmetric.  This game should be thought of as describing  the 
interactions  of the entire population of players, with their payoffs evaluated 
taking  into account  any uncertainty  about how they interact.  Players'  strategies 
are identified,  so that it is meaningful  to say that different  players  choose the 
same strategy,  or that a player chooses the same strategy  in different  periods. 
Players  play  only  pure strategies,  and their strategy  spaces  are one-dimensional.9 
I focus on coordination  games in which any symmetric  combination  of pure 
strategies is  an equilibrium,  and they are the only pure-strategy  equilibria. 
Because players'  roles are symmetric,  these equilibria  are Pareto-ranked  unless 
players are indifferent  between them. This makes the coordination  problem 
particularly  simple, with a  one-dimensional  continuum of  possible limiting 
outcomes  and an unambiguous  measure  of efficiency.  I further  restrict  attention 
to games in which each player's  best replies are given by a summary  statistic  of 
the strategies  chosen by all players  in the population  whenever  the statistic  in 
question is unaffected  by his choice. The summary  statistic can be written in 
general as y, =f(x,),  where xt  =  (x1t,  ...,  xnt)  and xit denotes player i's strat- 
egy choice at time t. I assume that f(  ) is continuous  and, for any xt and any 
constants a  and  b > 0,  f(a  + bx t, *  *  *, a + bXnt) =a + bf(Xlt*  Xnt).  These 
assumptions  are satisfied  when f(*)  is an order  statistic,  as in VHBB's  minimum 
and median treatments,  or a convex  combination  of order statistics  such as the 
arithmetic  mean.10  To see what they entail, note that because players'  roles are 
symmetric  f(  ) must be a symmetric  function of the xit; its value is therefore 
completely  determined  by the order statistics  of their empirical  distribution.  My 
9The  results of Crawford (1989) suggest that equilibria in which individuals play mixed strategies 
would  not  emerge  if  they were  allowed.  The  polymorphic configurations of  pure  strategies  that 
mixed-strategy equilibria often  represent  in  evolutionary  game  theory  are  allowed,  but  do  not 
emerge in the games studied here. 
10 When  players are risk-neutral their best  replies  in VHBB's  random-pairing minimum treat- 
ment are actually given by the median effort in the population. A risk-neutral player i  would like, 
ideally, to choose the xi  that maximizes 
E[ p min {xi,  xj}  -  qxi]  =p[1  -  G(xi)]xi  +pf  xj dG(xj)  -  qxi 
=  (p  -  q)xi  -pJ  xG(xj)  dxj, 
- 00 
where  p > q > 0, G(*)  is the  empirical distribution function of  the other  players' efforts, and the 
second  equality is obtained by integrating the  Stieltjes integral by parts. Computing the left-  and 
right-hand derivatives of  this objective function makes it clear that  xi* solves this problem if and 
only if  G(x)  <  (>)  1 -  q/p  when  x < (>)  x*,  so that  x*  is an order statistic of the distribution 
G(-).  In the  random-pairing minimum experiments  p = 2q,  so  that  xi* is the  median when  it is 
well-defined.  VHBB  also conducted  some  large-group minimum experiments in which the cost of 
effort was lowered to zero, making all efforts at or above the current minimum best replies and the 
highest effort a weakly dominant strategy. The  effect of dominance on players' strategy choices  is 
easily handled  within  the  model,  but  the  generic  multiplicity of  players' best  replies  raises  new 
issues, not addressed here. COORDINATION  GAMES  ll 
assumptions  rule out most nonlinear  functions  of these order statistics,  which is 
certainly  restrictive  but probably  not unrepresentative  of symmetric  games. 
The structure  of the environment  is made public  before play begins, and the 
value of the relevant  summary  statistic  is publicly  announced  after each play." 
Players'  beliefs and strategy  choices evolve as follows. Their beliefs at the start 
of play determine their initial choices. They then observe the value of the 
summary  statistic that results, update their beliefs and make new choices, and 
the process continues. Thus, players face uncertainty  only about each other's 
strategy  choices, and both the effects of those choices and the information  they 
receive about them are filtered  through  the summary  statistic.  It follows that in 
choosing their strategies, they need  form beliefs only about the  summary 
statistic. 
In this learning  process, even if players  form and revise their beliefs sensibly 
and choose their strategies optimally given their beliefs, their beliefs and 
strategy  choices may differ in unpredictable  ways. I imagine that each player 
begins  with a prior  about  the process  that generates yt, and that each period he 
updates his prior in response to his new information  and then chooses the 
strategy  that is optimal given his beliefs about yt. Players  whose priors differ 
may then have different  beliefs, even if they observe the same history  and use 
the same procedures to  interpret it. I  suppose that each player treats the 
probability  that his decisions  influence  the {ytj process as negligible,  so that his 
optimal  choice each period is determined  by his beliefs about the current  value 
of  yt; this is not strictly  necessary,  but it is a natural simplification  given the 
unimportance  of such influences in VHBB's experiments.12 Finally, I assume 
that each player's  prior  is sufficiently  undogmatic  that he will eventually  learn to 
predict Yt  correctly  if it converges. 
The importance  of the differences  in players'  beliefs and the need to supple- 
ment the theory with empirical  information  about them make it essential to 
represent  beliefs accurately  and flexibly,  and to describe  their evolution  in terms 
of observable  variables so that it is possible to estimate the parameters  left 
undetermined  by the theory.  It also seems advisable  to avoid unduly  restricting 
the form of players'  priors about the {ytj process, given the lack of theory on 
this issue. These considerations  suggest a model in the style of the adaptive 
control literature.'3  The key insight of the control literature  is that describing 
the evolution of agents' beliefs does not require that they be explicitly  repre- 
sented as probability  distributions  or their moments:  It is enough to model the 
"lAlthough  subjects were  told only their pair minimum in the  random-pairing minimum treat- 
ment, this can be viewed as a noisy estimate  of the population median that determined  their best 
replies (see footnote  10), so that the limitation on their information can be treated as an increase in 
the dispersion of their beliefs. 
12 In  a  large-group minimum game  a player can  expect  to  influence  the  minimum only  if  he 
reduces his effort below his estimate of the minimum of the others' choices, but the model implies 
that  he  will  never  do  this.  In  more  than  90% of  the  periods  in  the  other  treatments,  no  single 
sub)ect's choice could have altered the summary statistic. 
3See  for  example  Ljung and  Soderstrom  (1983)  and  Nevel'son  and  Has'minskii  (1973).  My 
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dynamics  of the estimates of the optimal decisions they imply,  which are the 
only aspects of agents' beliefs that affect the outcome. This simplification  will 
accommodate  the wide range of learning  behavior  VHBB's subjects  exhibited 
and make it possible to  describe the dynamics  in a simple framework  that 
satisfies  the desiderata  mentioned  above. 
The logic of this approach  and the need for accuracy  and flexibility  suggest 
that beliefs are best represented  by continuous  variables.  When strategies  are 
also continuously  variable  it is possible,  if players  are risk-averse  or risk-neutral, 
to represent their beliefs directly by their optimal decisions.14 Thus, in this 
section and the next, xi,  will represent both beliefs and strategy  choices. (In 
later sections xi,  will continue to represent beliefs and remain continuously 
variable, with strategy choices determined by a standard model of  discrete 
choice in which the xit are latent variables.)  Note that this way of representing 
players'  beliefs requires  no specific restrictions  on their priors or risk prefer- 
ences. There is also no need for a player's  beliefs, as represented  by his strategy 
choices, to be related  in any simple  way to the moments  of the distribution  that 
describes  his beliefs about yt. If, however,  players  come to expect a particular 
value of yt the xit will approach  that value;  thus, in the limit, their choices can 
be viewed as estimates  of the mean of yt. 
I follow the control literature  in assuming  that players'  beliefs and strategy 
choices evolve according  to linear adjustment  rules of the following  form: 
(1)  xi=  aj? 
and 
(2)  xit= ait + bityt-1 + (1  -1  (t=1,...). 
The ait  and bit in (1) and (2) are exogenous  coefficients,  which represent  any 
trends in players'  beliefs and how their beliefs respond to new information, 
thereby  reflecting  their precision.  These coefficients  are allowed  to vary  with i 
and t, as described  below, to accommodate  differences  in players'  beliefs and 
learning  behavior. 
Although (2) resembles partial adjustment  to the strategy  choice the latest 
observation  of yt suggests is optimal, it is taken here to represent  full adjust- 
ment to his current  estimate of his optimal decision,  which normally  responds 
less than fully  to each new observation  because it is only part of the information 
he has about the {ytj process.'5  Suppose,  for instance,  that player i's decisions 
are certainty-equivalent,  so that his optimal strategy  choice equals his current 
estimate  of the mean of yt. Then if he is convinced  that the yt are independent 
draws  from a fixed  distribution,  and if he puts as much  weight  on his prior  as he 
14 When players'  optimal decisions  do not preserve  enough information  about their beliefs to 
represent  them accurately,  it is necessary  to keep track  of beliefs and decisions  separately,  as in the 
analysis  of discrete  strategy  choice in Section  5. 
1 Note that these learning rules differ from those discussed in the psychological  learning 
literature  (see Roth and Erev (1995) for an interesting  application  in economics)  in that they 
incorporate  information  about  the game's  best-reply  structure.  This seems appropriate  for VHBB's 
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would on  X  such draws, he  will set  ait  0  and  bit  1/G(+t+  l),  as  in 
"fictitious  play."  If he believes instead  that the {yt}  process  is a driftless  random 
walk, he will set  ait  0 and bit  1, as in a "best-reply"  process. Thus (2) 
includes as special cases two of the learning rules most often studied in the 
game theory  literature. 
In general  players'  priors  are more complex  than this, and their decisions  may 
not be well approximated  by certainty  equivalence.  With or without certainty 
equivalence  or strong restrictions  on priors, players  whose adjustments  follow 
(2) will learn to predict yt if it converges  and choose xit that are optimal,  given 
their predictions, as long as a  --  0 as t --  oo  and 0 < bit < 1 for sufficiently large 
t. More generally,  learning  rules of this kind have been shown in the control 
literature  to provide a robust, effective approach  to the estimation  problems 
faced by agents who understand  the forecasting  problems they face but are 
unwilling  to make the specific  assumptions  about the process  or unable  to store 
and process the large amounts  of information  an explicitly  Bayesian  approach 
would require. 
It is plain that the learning  rules in (2) are usually  less than fully rational  in 
the sense used in game theory,  because  players'  priors  about  the structure  of the 
{yt} process are not required  to be correct,  and because the form of (2) may  be 
inconsistent  with the adjustment  rules that are optimal  given their priors  (which 
in general may depend nonlinearly,  and nonseparably,  on the observable  his- 
tory).  It might  be possible  to find repeated-game  equilibria,  perhaps  with payoff 
perturbations  as in McKelvey  and Palfrey's  (1992) analysis  of experiments  with 
the  centipede game, that are statistically  consistent with VHBB's subjects' 
behavior.  But for this application  it is both simpler  and, given  the unimportance 
of individual  subjects'  influences  on yt noted above,  more plausible  to adopt  the 
working  hypothesis  that players  focus on stage-game  strategies.'6  Under simple 
restrictions  on the learning  process  this approach  yields specific  predictions  that 
correspond to  the dynamics VHBB observed. Although the possibility that 
players choose optimally  given correct beliefs is not ruled out, it is strongly 
rejected  in the empirical  analysis. 
To sum up, although the specification  of players' learning rules used here 
cannot be defended by an appeal to rationality,  it accommodates  a wide range 
of sensible  rules,  which  locate players'  best replies  quickly  and reliably.  The case 
for this specification  is most compelling  when it is difficult  to defend specific 
restrictions  on the form  of players'  Bayesian  priors.  However,  the adjustments  it 
16 One might still try to impose rationality in the weaker sense  of requiring players' rules to be 
statistically optimal for the process implied by the model, on the assumption that their influences on 
Yt are negligible. If players' choices are certainty-equivalent, (2) includes rules (exponential smooth- 
ing with time-varying coefficients) that are optimal in this sense for {yj} processes close to the one 
implied by the model (which is shown below to resemble a random walk plus noise, with drift and 
declining variances); see Harvey (1989). However, the logic of this approach also requires using the 
underlying variances of the process to determine the optimal coefficients of the learning rule. Even 
without the restrictive form of (2), attempts to close the loop in this way ultimately founder on the 
multiplicity  of  equilibria  in  the  learning  process,  and  in  any  case  do  not  help  to  explain  the 
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implies are qualitatively  similar  to those of Bayesian  players  and coincide  with 
them in leading cases. Thus, using (2) might  not be a significant  source  of error 
even if the population  consisted entirely  of Bayesians  with known  priors.  More 
to the point, it appears to be a reasonable  way to describe players'  behavior 
when, as  here, precise knowledge about their priors and decision rules is 
lacking. 
When players'  learning  rules are described  by (2), differences  in their beliefs 
appear,  to an outside observer  or the players  themselves,  as random  variations 
in the ait and bit, In keeping with their unpredictability,  I characterize  them 
statistically,  treating  certain  parameters  of their distributions  as behavioral  data. 
Thus, let 
(3)  sit  ait - at  and  it -bit  -8t  (t = 1,...) 
where at  and  t  are the common expected values of the  ait and bit, The 
restrictions  on the ait and bit discussed  above  suggest  that at  -O  as t --oo (but 
that the  at  may have either sign before  they converge) and that 0 <,bt < 1. By 
construction,  EEit = E-1it = 0 for  all  i  and  t, where  Ez  denotes  the  expected 
value of the random  variable  z ex ante (that is, before random  variables  dated 0 
are drawn).  I assume  that the Eit  and nit  are serially  independent.  This amounts 
to assuming  that xiti,  fully captures any future effects of idiosyncratic  influ- 
ences on player  i's beliefs through  period t -  1, which  is restrictive,  but seems a 
reasonable  simplification.  It is then a natural  extension  of my assumption  that 
players  are indistinguishable  ex ante to assume that the Eit and nit  are jointly 
independently  and identically  distributed  (henceforth,  "i.i.d.")  across i for any 
given t, with exogenous common  variances  and covariances,  denoted o-,  at 
and Kt respectively.17 
It is convenient  to rewrite  the model by substituting  (3) into (1) and (2) and 
letting 
(4)  V  iO =io  and  tit  8it+  (yt_l-xitJ)qit  (t=  1,...), 
which  yields 
(5)  xio=  ao  +  Vio 
and 
(6)  xit =  tt +f  tyt-l  + (l-t)Xit-1+  t  (t= 1,...). 
The  vit  are idiosyncratic  random variables that represent the differences in 
players'  initial beliefs and in how they respond  to new observations.  It is easily 
verified  that, like the Eit  and nits  they are ex ante identically  distributed  across  i 
for any given t. Further,  letting E,(z I  ) represent  the conditional  expectation 
of the random  variable  z given  the information  available  at time s (that is, after 
random  variables  dated s are drawn)  and using  the law of iterated  expectations, 
17 Note  that it is  not  assumed that  Eit and  nit  are independent  of  each  other. This would be 
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E[;it;jt]=E[Et-,(;it;jtlxt-,)]=O  for  any  i#j  and  any  t;  and  E;it=?, 
E  itl  ) =  O, and  E[;i,vjt] =  E[E,(;i  jtlx,,  i)]  =  E[;iE(jtlx,)]=  O for any 
i, j  and any s, t  with s < t. Thus, although  the distribution  of  Vit depends on 
xt-1  and therefore on  -it_l  and the other  -jt_,, the Vit  are uncorrelated across i 
for any given t and serially  uncorrelated.  The common  ex ante variance  of the 
cit'  which is endogenous  but well defined once ot-  171t, and Kt are specified,  is 
denoted o-J, and the conditional  variance  of Vit  given xt1  is denoted o2tIx_1. 
Under these distributional  assumptions,  (5) and (6) define a Markov  process 
with state vector xt, in which  players'  beliefs and strategy  choices are identically 
distributed ex  ante, but not in  general otherwise. The recursive structure, 
together with the conditional independence of players' deviations from the 
average learning rule, captures the requirement  that players must form their 
beliefs and choose their strategies independently  which is the essence of the 
coordination  problem. 
The dynamics  are driven  by the dispersion  of players'  beliefs, as represented 
by the otlxt  1. This is true even though the model is formally  consistent  with 
any history  of the yt for any n and ffQ), with the at varying  as necessary  over 
time and players'  beliefs constrained  to be identical  throughout.  (If o  Ix_1 =  0 
for all i and t, so that Vit  = 0 with probability  one, then (5) and (6) imply  that 
it  =yt=  Et=oaa.) Solutions  of this kind, in which players  jump simultaneously 
from one stage-game  equilibrium  to the next following  some commonly  under- 
stood pattern,  correspond  to equilibria  of the repeated  game that are difficult  to 
rule out using  traditional  refinements.  Yet it is clear that they provide  neither a 
meaningful explanation of  the  dynamics of  yt  nor an  adequate statistical 
summary  of subjects'  strategy  choices. I shall therefore  ask that the model meet 
both of  these  goals simultaneously,  without such ad  hoc variations in  its 
parameters. 
This requires that players differ significantly  in  their responses to  new 
information  as well as in their initial beliefs. To see this, assume for simplicity 
that at=0  for all  t=1.  If  ;2=E2>0  but ot  Ixtl1=0 for all i  and 
t =  1,...,  then (6) (with Vit  = a-t  = 0 and 0 <  J3t <  1) implies that (xit -  yt- 1) and 
(xit -1 - yt- 1) always  have the same sign,  with xit closer to yt- 1 than xit -1 was. 
It follows that players'  strategy  choices converge  to yt monotonically,  without 
overshooting,  and therefore,  when ff()  is an order statistic,  that yt  Y0  for all 
t, independent of n and f(  ). This extreme history-dependence  is consistent 
with the results for VHBB's median treatments  but not for their minimum 
treatments.  8 
Given that  t- Ixt 1 > 0,  the model is closest to  other work on  adaptive 
dynamics  when at = 0 for all t = 1,...  and 8t and ;it  x  t-  remain  constant  at 
18 In the  large-group minimum treatment,  for instance,  subjects whose  efforts were  above  the 
minimum adjusted their efforts only part of the way toward it on average. Thus, without persistent 
differences in subjects' responses to new information the minimum would never have fallen. In fact, 
however,  there  was  enough  variation in  subjects' responses,  given the  size  of  the  population,  to 
make the minimum fall in 9 out of the 13 instances in which it was not already at the lowest possible 
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positive  levels or converge  to positive  limits,  so that the process  has stationary  or 
asymptotically  stationary  transition  probabilities  and a unique, globally  stable 
ergodic  distribution.  Then, the methods  of Freidlin  and Wentzell  (1984),  as first 
applied in this area by Foster and Young (1990) and subsequently  adapted to 
discrete state spaces by Kandori,  Mailath,  and Rob (1993) and Young (1993a), 
can be applied  to the model with discrete  strategy  choice analyzed  in Section 5. 
In the long run the process cycles perpetually  among  the pure-strategy  equilib- 
ria of the underlying  game, with their prior probabilities  at any given time 
determined  by the ergodic  distribution.  As the o-t Ixt_  are allowed  to approach 
zero (remaining  constant  over time) the ergodic  distribution  assigns  probability 
approaching  one to the equilibrium  with the lowest effort whenever  the sum- 
mary statistic is  below the  median, and approaches a  limit with positive 
probability  on every equilibrium  when the summary  statistic is the median, in 
each case independent  of the number  of players.19 
Thus, an analysis  is the style of Kandori,  Mailath,  and Rob (1993) and Young 
(1993a)  discriminates  between VHBB's  large-group  minimum  treatment  on one 
hand and their median treatments  and random-pairing  minimum  treatment  (in 
which  the relevant  summary  statistic  is also the median,  as explained  in footnote 
10) on the other, but otherwise does not distinguish  between them. These 
conclusions  are not logically  inconsistent  with the systematic,  persistent  effects 
of the number  of players  and the summary  statistic  within  the finite horizons  of 
VHBB's experiments,  but they suggest that an analysis  based entirely on the 
limiting  distributions  of an ergodic  learning  process  with infrequent  "mutations" 
is of limited use in understanding  those effects. 
The methods developed below characterize  the probability  distributions  of 
the entire time paths of yt and the xit, whether or not the process is ergodic 
and the o-J Ixt_  are small. As will become clear, the model's dynamics  are 
closest to VHBB's results  when the o-JlIxt_  decline steadily  over time-even- 
tually  to zero, given subjects'  tendency  to "lock in" on an equilibrium-just as 
one would expect as players  gain experience  forecasting yt. 
4.  ANALYSIS 
The model's "evolutionary"  structure  makes it analytically  tractable  despite 
its nonlinearity  and the nonstationarity  of its transition probabilities.  When 
players'  interactions  are filtered  through  a summary  statistic  f(x1,,...,  x"t) with 
the property that f(a  + bxlt,  ...  , a + bXnt)  a + bf(Xlt,  ...,  xnt),  the outcome 
can be expressed  as a function of the idiosyncratic  shocks that represent the 
differences  between their beliefs. In what follows, sums with no terms (like 
-1 Bs+ 1  fs  for t = 0) should be understood  to equal 0, and products  with no 
terms should be understood to equal 1. All limits are taken as t --  oo. 
19 This follows because  fewer changes  in individual players' efforts are required to  get from a 
high-effort equilibrium to the basin of attraction of a low-effort equilibrium than vice versa if, and 
only if, the summary statistic is below the median. Robles (1994) analyzes a closely related model for 
the  games  studied  here,  showing that  this  conclusion  changes  only  slightly when  players do  not 
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PROPOSITION  1: The unique solution of  (5) and (6) is given, for all i and t, by 
t  t-1 
(7)  Xit  =  a  cs +  E  Ps+  l  s + Zit 
s=O  s=O 
and 
t  t-1 
(8)  Yt  =5  ats  +  E  1s+lfs  +fttS 
s=O  s=O 
where 
t  t -s 
(9)  Zit  1  -ot-j+ 1)  vjs  and  ft=f  (zj,..,znt) 
S=0  _J=1 
PROOF:  The solution follows immediately  by induction on  t, recalling that 
f(a  + bx1t,.*.*, a + bxt)n  a +bf(Xlt.....  xIn)  and noting  that zit = (1 -/3dZit- 
+ Vit  for all t. Uniqueness  also follows immediately by induction.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  1 represents  the outcome  of the learning  dynamics  as the cumula- 
tive effect of trend and shock terms from each period, each of whose effects 
persist indefinitely.  (The remaining  terms, zit in (7) and ft in (8), are subsumed 
in the  shock terms after the period in which they first appear.) Thus the 
coordination  process  resembles  a random  walk,  but with declining  variances  and 
possibly nonzero drift. Although Proposition l's  solution remains valid no 
matter how the Vjt  are generated,  much of its usefulness in the analysis  below 
stems from the fact that the shock terms are knQwn  functions  of the zit, which 
under my assumptions are ex ante identically distributed and uncorrelated 
across i for all t. 
The next proposition  provides  conditions  under  which  the dynamics  converge, 
with probability  1, to one of the symmetric  Nash equilibria  of the underlying 
coordination  game. In this proposition,  and sometimes  below, it is necessary  to 
bound players' strategies.  This is accomplished  by increasing xit to its lower 
bound, denoted x, or reducing  it to its upper bound, denoted x, whenever it 
would otherwise  fall outside the interval  [x, x]. This is equivalent  to increasing 
Vio  to  x -  ao (or reducing it to  x -  ao) when it would otherwise fall below 
(above)  that  value  and  increasing  Vjt to  x -  a  -tyt  -  (1 -8)xjt_1  (or 
reducing  it  to  X  -  ao -  tyt-l-  (1  -  )xit-)  when  it  would  otherwise  fall 
below (above) that value. The resulting  truncation  of the conditional  distribu- 
tions of the Vjt  is consistent  with the distributional  assumptions  introduced  in 
Section 3, except that it may bias the E;io or the  Et_1(;itjxt_j)  away from zero 
and induce serial or contemporaneous  correlation  in the Vit;  I indicate below 
when this affects  the results. 
PROPOSITION  2:  Assume that the distributions of the Vit are truncated so that 
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0 <  3  < 13 <  1  for  all  t,  and  E,=oa,  and  E,=o j2  are finite,  y,  and  the xit 
converge, with probability 1, to a common, finite limit. 
PROOF: The proof  follows  the martingale  convergence  arguments  of Nevel'son 
and Has'minskii  (1973, Theorem 2.7.3).2? Consider the  Lyapunov function 
Vt  -  Li j(x-  xit)2,  where the summation is taken over all i, j=1,...,  n. Clearly, 
Vt  > 0 for all xt, with Vt  = 0 if and only if xit  =xjt  for all i and j. Substituting 
from (6) and simplifying, 
(10)  Vt =  E  [(1-8t  )(xit-1  x-xt-)  +  vit  -jt] 
i,j 
-  [(1  13t)2(Xit-l-xit_l)2 
i,  J 
+2(1  -It)(xit-1  -xt-1)(;it-jt)  + (-it  jt)] 
Taking  expectations  in (10) yields 
(  V~~~~~~~~,  (11)  Et_1(VtlXt_l)  = (1-_,t)2  (Xit,_-xjtJ  l) 
i,  j 
+ 2(1  -8t)  E  (xit-,  -xjt-,)Et-,  [;it -  jt] |xt-1) 
i,iJ 
+ J:Et_1([Ri jt-  ] 
2 
Xt_J) 
i,  J 
The first term on the right-hand  side of (11) is plainly  bounded  below Vt-> for 
all xt-1 outside any given neighborhood  of the set for which Vt 1 = 0. Without 
truncation  the second term equals  0, and the third  term eventually  approaches  0 
with probability  1 because o2  must approach  0 for E=0  to be finite and this 
cannot  occur  unless  Et_ 1(;  2tIxt 1)  approaches  0  with  probability  1.  Thus, 
without  truncation  {Vt}  eventually  becomes a nonnegative  supermartingale,  and 
therefore converges  with probability  1, under the stated variance  condition,  to 
its lower  bound,  0. Because  truncation  at time t can never  increase  Et  1(Vt  Ix_  t) 
or Et  - 1(2tIxt-1), this conclusion extends to the truncated  version of the {Vt} 
process. It follows that (xit -  xjt) converges to 0, with probability  1, for all 
i,  j  =  1, ...,  n,  and  therefore  (because  yt =f(xt),  ff()  is  continuous,  and 
f(a  .. ., a)  a)  that (yt -xit)  also converges to  0  with probability 1.  The 
convergence  of the xit (and not just their differences)  then follows, given that 
they are bounded,  from two observations:  (i) xt cannot (with positive  probabil- 
ity) return  infinitely  often to a given point at which xit =A  yt for some i, because 
20 Nevel'son and Has'minskii's  (1973) generalization  of Lyapunov's  global-stability  criterion  to 
stochastic  dynamic  systems is a useful alternative  to the techniques  of  Ljung (see Ljung and 
Soderstrom  (1983))  used by Woodford  (1990).  Nevel'son  and Has'minskii  require  that the Lyapunov 
function  approach  infinity  with llxtIl,  but they use this condition  only to ensure  the boundedness  of 
solution paths; in Proposition  2 boundedness  is assumed directly.  The variance  condition they 
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the (y, -xi)  converge  to 0 with probability  1; and (ii) x, cannot (with positive 
probability)  oscillate  infinitely  often between distinct  points at which xi, = y, for 
all i, because E'=oas  and the Es=O;is  also converge  (the latter  with probability 
1) under  the stated  conditions.  Q.E.D. 
Because the xit, and therefore the (xit -  Yt), are bounded, (4) implies that for 
E7=o  0  7to  be finite it is sufficient  that E  os=oa2s  and Es=0 7  be finite, and 
necessary that ES=o-2,  be  finite. Although it  is plainly not necessary that 
S  be finite, I have not been  able to use this possibility to weaken these 
sufficient  conditions  for convergence  in any useful way. I have also not been 
able, without  truncating  the distributions  of the  jit,  to rule out the possibility  of 
solutions  in which Yv  and the xit diverge  together  to ? oo,  but the conclusion  of 
Proposition  2 seems likely  to remain  valid for well-behaved  unbounded  distribu- 
tions. 
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the model determines a prior probability 
distribution  over limiting  equilibria  that is normally  nondegenerate,  rather  than 
singling out a particular  equilibrium.  This is consistent with the variations 
observed across different runs in some of VHBB's treatments, and follows 
naturally  from characterizing  players'  beliefs statistically  instead of assuming 
that they can be determined  entirely  within  the model. 
I now consider  the model's  comparative  dynamics  properties,  focusing  on how 
changes in VHBB's treatment variables, the number of players, n,  and the 
summary  statistic,  ff(),  affect the prior probability  distributions  of the yt and 
xit. 21  Propositions  3  and 4  characterize  these effects qualitatively  for given 
values of the behavioral  parameters  at,  3t, oet  a7t, and Kt,  showing  that they 
are fully consistent with the patterns of  variation in  the  dynamics VHBB 
observed  across  treatments.  Propositions  5 and 6 then show how the means and 
variances  of the yt and xit are determined  by the treatment  variables  and the 
parameters,  to assess the quantitative  magnitudes  of these effects. 
These results are then used to  explain the  patterns of  variation in  the 
dynamics.  As with any model whose predictions  depend on empirical  parame- 
ters, the explanation  rests on the assumption  that the parameters  are stable 
across runs in any given treatment.  (Sample-splitting  tests and inspecting  the 
data suggest  that this is not a bad assumption.)  But something  more is involved 
here, because each treatment is  a  different game, and there is  no  good 
theoretical reason to expect players' responses to be  the same in different 
games. Thus, in principle, the effects of changes in the treatment  variables 
identified in Propositions  3 and 4 might be swamped  by large, unpredictable 
changes in the behavioral  parameters.  Such changes would leave the model's 
ability  to predict coordination  outcomes unaffected,  as long as the behavioral 
21 Broseta  (1993a)  studies the comparative  dynamics  of a closely related model that allows for 
autoregressive  conditional  heteroskedasticity  in the idiosyncratic  components  of players'  beliefs, 
obtaining  some results like those given here and others concerning  the effects of changes  in the 
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parameters  remained  stable across runs in each treatment.  They would, how- 
ever, reduce the patterns  of variation  in the dynamics  to a primarily  empirical 
question,  limiting  the theory's  usefulness  beyond those environments  for which 
the parameters  have been estimated and leaving it unable to explain  why the 
dynamics  varied across treatments  as they did in VHBB's experiments.  There 
would then be no reason  to expect similar  results  or patterns  of variation  in the 
dynamics  for nearby  values of the treatment  variables. 
This question is addressed  below by showing  that the most important  differ- 
ences VHBB observed across treatments were mainly the  product of  the 
interactions  between the number  of players,  the summary  statistic,  and strategic 
uncertainty  characterized  in Propositions  3-6.  Unreported simulations  of the 
present model and the sensitivity  analysis  of a closely related model in Broseta 
(1993a) reveal that the patterns  in the dynamics  are highly  robust  to moderate 
changes in the behavioral  parameters,  which are shown in the econometric 
analysis in Section 6 to vary surprisingly  little across treatments. Estimates 
based on Propositions  5 and 6 suggest  that the effects of the important  changes 
in treatment  variables  were systematic  and large enough  to swamp  the effects of 
the changes in the behavioral  parameters  they induced; this is confirmed  in 
Section 7 when the model is simulated  using Section 6's estimates.  Thus, there 
is good reason to expect similar  results in nearby  environments,  and to believe 
that the patterns  VHBB observed  are replicable. 
In what follows,  the jth order statistic  of an empirical  distribution  (l,....  .,  n) 
is defined to be the jth smallest  of the ei; thus, the minimum  is the first order 
statistic and the median (for odd n) is the ((n + 1)/2)th.  If ffQ) is an order 
statistic,  the index j identifies  which  one; and if ffQ) is a convex  combination  of 
order statistics, j  indexes the order statistics from which it is computed.  An 
"increase  in j" refers,  in general,  to a shift in the weights  used to compute  ffQ) 
that increases j  in the sense of first-order  stochastic  dominance,  viewing the 
weights as a probability  distribution  for the purpose  of applying  the definition. 
A random  variable  is said to "stochastically  increase"  if its probability  distribu- 
tion shifts upward  in the sense of first-order  stochastic  dominance. 
PROPOSITION  3:  Suppose  that  bit  > 0 for all i and t, so that  axi,/ayt-  1  > 0 with 
probability one.  Then, holding n constant, increasing i stochastically increases y, 
and the xi,  for any t. 
PROOF:  The  proof is  immediate from (2)  by induction, noting that for 
any given value of x,-  1' y-1  and therefore x,,  is weakly larger when computed 
for the larger  value of j.  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION  4:  Suppose  that  bi, > 0 for all i and t, so that axi,/ay,-  1  > 0 with 
probability one.  Then,  holding j  (or  the  weights on  alternative values  of  j) 
constant, increasing n stochastically decreases yt and the xit  for any t. COORDINATION  GAMES  121 
PROOF: The proof is immediate from (2) by induction,  noting that for any 
given value of xt  -1  (with i running  from 1 to the larger  value of n),  yt -1  and 
therefore  xt, is weakly  smaller  when computed  for the larger  value of n.  Q.E.D. 
Propositions  3 and 4 hold whether or not the distributions  of the  vit  are 
truncated. They make precise, in the probabilistic  sense appropriate  to the 
model, the common  intuitions  that coordination  is more difficult,  the smaller  the 
subsets of  the population that can adversely affect the outcome, and that 
coordination  is more difficult  in larger groups because it requires coherence 
among  a larger  number  of independent  decisions. 
Let a-2t  denote the common  ex ante variance  of the zit.  Because the vit  are 
serially uncorrelated, it follows from (9) that  o,2t-  Et = o[H  t  s(l  _j  +  1)]2- 
Define  /-t  Ef(Z1/t-zt  **...  Zntl/ozt)  Because  the random variables  zitl/zt  are 
standardized,  with common mean 0 and common  variance 1, A-'t  is completely 
determined by n, f0  ), and the joint distribution of the  Zitl/zt  -tt is subscripted 
only  because  the  distribution of  the  zitl/zt  is  generally  time-dependent;  its 
dependence  on n and fQ  ) is suppressed  for clarity.  It is easily shown,  using the 
properties  of order statistics,  that 1-tt is decreasing  in n and increasing  in j and 
that, if n > 2 and the zit  are distributed  symmetrically  about 0, then A-'t < 0 if 
1 <i  <(n  + 1)/2,  A-'t  =  0 if j=(n  + 1)/2,  and At > 0 if (n + 1)/2 <j  < n. 
PROPOSITION 5:  The ex ante means of Yt  and the xit  are given, for all i and t, 
by 
t  t-1 
(12)  Exit=  E a5 +  E  fs+  1o5zs,s 
5=0  5=0 
and 
t  t-1 
(13)  Eyt=  Eas+  ESs+lCzsAs+ztAt 
s=0  s=0 
PROOF: Taking  expectations  in (7) and (8), using (9), and noting that 
( 14)  Ef (Z l s  **  Zn,) )E  [ 0rZS  A  Z  ls/ozs  ,**  Znslozs  ) ]-Czs/s 
immediately  yields  (12) and (13).  Q.E.D. 
Let Var  z and Cov(z, z') denote the ex ante variance  of the random  variable 
z  and  the  covariance of  the  random variables  z  and  z'.  Let  at-2 
Vart(Zlt/?"zts  * * * l Znt/zt),  Zt)f(Zlt/ztl  I * *nt/zt)]  (for any i), 
and  8st  = Cov[f(zs/zS...,  Zns/zs),  A Z1t1?/zt-  Izntazt)].  Like /tt  the pa- 
rameters  yt-, Vt'  and 8st  are completely  determined  by n, f(),  and the joint 
distribution of the  zisl/zs  and  Zitl/zt;  they are subscripted only because  that 
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PROPOSITION 6:22  The ex ante variances of yt and the xi,  are given, for all i and 
t, by 
t-1  t-1  t-s 
(15)  Varxi,= 
p  2+13  2or2+ E  3S+jo2  (1  (1  8-1+i)v5 
s=O  s=O  j=l 
t-1  s-1 
+ 2 E  E  r+i13s+izr'0zs  8rs  +  zt 
s=1  r=O 
and 
t-1  t-1 
(16)  Var yt=  E  o82+1  2r2  +  E  >S+313o  ztU 
s=O  s=O 
t-1  s-1 
+ 2 E  E 1r+i13s+iO'zrOTzs  rs  +  t(  7t 
s=1  r=O 
PROOF:  Taking variances in (7) and (8) yields 
t-1  t-1 
(17)  Varxit=  E  32+1VarfS+  E1s+1Cov(fS,z  t) 
s=O  s=O 
t-1  s-1 
+ 2 E  E,  r+13s+  1COV( fr, fs)  + Var  zit 
s=1  r=O 
and 
t-1  t-1 
(18)  Vary=  yt  E82+1Varf5+  E8s5+1Cov(fS,ft) 
s=O  s=O 
t-1  s-1 
+ 2 E  E,  r+13s+C  Cov(fr,fs)  + Varft. 
s=1  r=O 
Because the zisl/ozs are standardized,  with mean 0 and variance  1, 
(19)  Var  fs  Var  f (zls,...,* z,s) 
-Var  [o-zs  f ( Z  15/o  *.*,zns/o5)]  -0 
...- 
For any t >  s, zit in (9) can be expressed  as 
t-s  t-s  rt-s-k 
(20)J_  Zi 
1-8j+l)i  is  E  FL  (1  -8t-j+l)  1;sk  1=1  k=1 -Lj=1J 
Because  Ezit =  O and  E(zisit)  =  E[Es(zisitlxs,  zis)] =  E[zisEs(;itxs)]  =  O for 
22 Because the proof of Proposition 6 uses the properties of the untruncated distributions of the 
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any s < t, it follows from (20) and my assumptions  on ffQ) that, for all s < t, 
(21)  Cov(fs,  Zit)  = E  [zij  (zls,  zns)] 
= 
z2sE[(zis1qzs/)  f  ( 
z 
ls/lzs*  Znslzs), 
t-s 
xFl  (1  -8t  j+l) 
j=l 
t-s 
=ozsys17  (1-t_j+l)  j=1 
and 
(22)  Cov  fs,  ft  =Cov[f(Zls  ***  Zns)  f(Zlt  ***  Znt)I 
-ZS(7zt  Cov  [ f  (  z  s/(Zs  Znslo/zso), 
f  (  Z  ltl'7zt,  -  *Znt/Orzt)  I 
o-(zs(Jzt  st' 
Substituting  (19), (21), and (22) into (17) and (18) yields  (15) and (16).  Q.E.D. 
Techniques  like those used to prove Propositions  5 and 6 make it possible to 
compute the ex ante variances o-t  and  zt  recursively  from the fundamental 
parameters.  Given (4) and (9), 
(23)  z2-vo  EO 
and 
(24)  (J  =  (1-  1)2z2t  +  Jt. 
Combining (4), (7), (8), (14), and (21) and recalling that  Kt  -  Cov(Eit,  nit)  yields 
(25)  1r+2t  = or)2t  + 2  ooz  tILL  t Kt+zt(t+  2 
Intuition suggests that both O2t and ozt  should decline over time as players 
learn to forecast  Yt.  It is clear from (23) and (24) that (with 0 <J8t S 1) the  o2 
are declining  whenever  the az2t  are, so that requiring  the ozt to decline is more 
stringent  than requiring  the a2t to decline. 
The formulas  in Propositions  5 and 6 show with considerable  generality  how 
the dispersion of players' beliefs interacts with the strategic environment  to 
determine the mean and variance  of the outcome. But before those formulas 
can be put to practical  use, numerical  values  must  be assigned  to the parameters 
that appear in them. As noted above, the behavioral parameters at'  Pt'  and o-t, 
171t,  and Kt (which  determine  the azt)  must be estimated  for each environment; 
this is done for VHBB's experiments  in Section 6. The remaining  parameters 
A  ot2,  V7t2  and 8st  are completely determined by n, fQ ), and the distributions of 
the  zit  (which are determined  by the  distributions of the  Eit  and Tit),  but are 
difficult to  evaluate due  to  the  complexity of  their dependence on  those 
distributions. 
This problem can be overcome in two ways. Evaluating l  7t,  a t2  and 8st  can 
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by the model directly  by repeated  simulation;  this is done in Section 7, using  the 
parameter  estimates  reported  in Section 6. Alternatively,  the outcome distribu- 
tions can be approximated  analytically  under simplifying  assumptions  about the 
distributions  of the zi, 
Because the analytical  results  provide  insight  into the workings  of the model, 
I outline the approximation  method here.23  The approximations  are based on 
the assumption  that the  zit  are jointly normally  distributed  for any given t. 
Normality  is a reasonable  approximation,  at least when truncation  effects are 
negligible, because the  zit  are weighted sums of  the  cit,  which are weakly 
dependent and likely to be  approximately  conditionally  normal for familiar 
reasons.24  Normality  simplifies  matters  by making  the common distribution  of 
the zit/o?t  independent  of  t, so that At -  X  ,y2-  and yt  -y.  Given that 
the  zit/azt  are  uncorrelated  for  any given  t,  the  parameters  ,u and  o-2  are 
tabulated  in Teichroew  (1956) for any order statistic  of the normal  distribution 
and any n < 20; and it can be shown  that y = l/n.25 Finally,  for jointly  normal 
zis  and zit  ,st  is completely determined  by the common correlation  between 
the  standardized  zis/o-zs  and the corresponding  Zit?zt.  Because  E(zisit)  =  0 
whenever  s < t, (20) implies that this correlation  then equals 
t-s 
(26)  Cov  (  Zis  1  Zit  ) /?zsozt  =  H  (1 -  38t  -j  1  )  (Var  zis) /o-zso-zt 
j=1 
t-s 
=  171(1  -  3t-j+0)zs1?z, 
j=1 
23AAn earlier  version,  Crawford (1992),  provides  more  detail  about  the  approximations  and 
com2pares  them with the probabilities estimated directly by repeated simulation. 
2  It does not seem possible to give an exact justification for this assumption. Normality of the  zit 
would follow from joint normality of the  vit,  even though they are dependent,  because  the normal 
distributions form a stable class. But even if the eit  and nit  were normal the  vit  could not be jointly 
normal, because  then their lack of serial correlation would imply that they were  serially indepen- 
dent, a contradiction. 
25 Let f'( ) denote  the jth  order statistic. If (.  are any i.i.d. random variables, it follows 
from symmetry, the linearity of the expectations operator, and the fact that the sum of an empirical 
distribution's elements  equals the sum of its order statistics that 
=E[n)  (ib  YJE[f f  fO((*E[f(  .  n)Eij 
n j=  nj= 
1  n~~~~~ 
-E  f((  ,  n)  E f 
n)] 
j=1 
It is well known (see for example Jones (1948)) that when the (i  are standard normal, the sum in the 
last term equals 1 for any order statistic f(  );  this conclusion extends immediately to the case where 
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Thus,  under  normality  8st  can  be  written  as  8(pst), where  pst-- FlI-s(l  - 
f3t-j  + )?s/?t  It is clear that 0  pst  <  1, and that the function 8( ) is differen- 
tiable and monotonically  increasing  on the interval [0,  1], with 8(0) = 0 and 
8(1)  =  -2.  The function 5( ) has not been tabulated, to my knowledge,  but 
could be tabulated  with some effort. 
An explanation  for the patterns of variation in the dynamics  can now be 
discerned.  (This explanation  is made precise in Section 7, taking the discrete- 
ness of players'  strategy  choices into account.) For simplicity,  ignore the dis- 
creteness and boundedness  of yt and the xit, assume  normality  of the zit, and 
suppose that as  0 and Bs =,1 for all s = 1....  and that Et0=o-s -*  S. Proposi- 
tion 5 then implies that Eyt and Exit approach  the approximate  common  limit 
a0 + A,u,S.  Given that ,u is determined  by n and ff(),  this formula  shows how 
the means and dispersions  of players'  beliefs and the average  rate at which  they 
respond to  new information interact with the  number of  players and the 
summary  statistic to determine  the ex ante mean of the limiting  coordination 
outcome. 
For VHBB's random-pairing  minimum  treatment  (viewed as a median treat- 
ment, as  in  footnote  10) and their median treatments, A,  = 0  because of 
symmetry.  Thus, in these treatments  the approximate  common  limit of Eyt and 
Eyit is a0. The estimates  of a0 in Section 6 range  from  4.30 in the random-pair- 
ing minimum  treatment  to 4.71 and 4.75 in median treatments '  and F  and 
6.26 in median treatment n  (whose payoff  structure,  described  in footnote 34 
below, made the efficient  equilibrium  with effort 7 more prominent  than in the 
other treatments). For VHBB's  large-group minimum treatment,  At=  -1.74.26 
The estimates of  a0  and p are 5.45 and 0.25 respectively,  and S (which is 
difficult  to estimate for this treatment,  due to boundary  effects) appears  highly 
unlikely to be less than 10. Thus, the approximate  common limit of Eyt and 
Exit, ao + At1S, is at most 1.10. 
Even the simplifying  assumptions  made above  in approximating  the means do 
not yield simple expressions  for Var yt and Var  xit, but Proposition  6 can be 
used to get some idea of how they vary  with the environment.  Because 5(pst) 
increases smoothly  from 0 to  o-2 as Pst ranges from 0 to 1, its value can be 
roughly  approximated  by psto2.  It then follows from (15) and (16) that Var  yt 
and Varxit  are approximately  proportional  to  o-2 for each treatment, with 
factors  of proportionality  determined  by n,  13,  and the  z2t. 
Like A, oJ2 iS determined  by n and f(-).  o-2  =  0.17 in the median  treatments, 
0.10 in the random-pairing  minimum  treatment, and 0.30 in the large-group 
minimum  treatment.  The estimates of  o-t  and O-1t  reported in Section 6 are 
small for the median treatments,  significantly  larger for the large-group  mini- 
mum treatment,  and much larger  for the random-pairing  minimum  treatment. 
This suggests  that the ex ante variance  of the limiting  outcome is small in the 
26  This value for ,u and the values for  0,2  given below are taken from Teichroew's (1956) Tables I 
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median treatments, larger in the large-group  minimum treatment, and still 
larger  in the random-pairing  minimum  treatment. 
These approximations  suggest that the limiting  prior probability  distribution 
of  y,  is relatively concentrated,  with means 4.71, 4.75, and 6.26 in median 
treatments ',  F,  and Q respectively;  somewhat  more diffuse, with mean no 
greater  than 1.10, in the large-group  minimum  treatment;  and still more diffuse, 
with mean 4.30, in the random-pairing  minimum  treatment.  These estimated 
means are very close to those implied by the precise estimates of the limiting 
prior probability  distributions  implied by the model, and almost as close to 
those implied  by the last-period  frequency  distributions  in VHBB's  experiments 
(both of  these distributions  are reported in Tables VI-Xa).  The suggested 
ordering of  the variances is  also qualitatively  consistent with the precisely 
estimated limiting distributions  and VHBB's limiting frequency distributions, 
once the effect of the lower boundary  in the large-group  minimum  treatment  is 
taken into account.  I do not estimate the variances  here because this adds little 
intuition,  and the distributions  are estimated  precisely  below. 
The  most important changes in  the  dynamics across treatments VHBB 
observed were between the random-pairing  and large-group  minimum  treat- 
ments, and between the  median treatments and the  large-group  minimum 
treatment.  Viewing  the random-pairing  minimum  treatment  as a median treat- 
ment, as explained in footnotes 10 and 11, the model treats the differences 
between these treatments  primarily  as changes in the summary  statistic (even 
though the former difference  is "really"  a change in group size and the latter 
also involves a change in the size of the group, from 9 to  about 15). The 
estimates of the limiting means of  y, given above suggest that each of these 
changes altered the drift of the process by much more than the accompanying 
changes  in the behavioral  parameters. 
VHBB also observed  differences  in the dynamics  between the median treat- 
ments  and  the random-pairing  minimum  treatment.  These were generally  smaller 
and of a different  character,  having  to do with the rate of convergence  and, in 
one case, the mean outcome. The model treats the differences  between these 
treatments  mainly  as changes  in group  size, which  are relatively  small and in any 
case have no effect on drift. The above estimates of the limiting  means of y, 
suggest that the effects of  these changes in treatment variables are mainly 
determined  by changes  in the behavioral  parameters. 
5.  DISCRETE  STRATEGY  CHOICE 
I now extend the analysis  to the discrete strategy  spaces of VHBB's experi- 
mental environments.  The xi,  will continue to represent  players'  beliefs, and 
remain continuously  variable, but instead of  representing players' strategy 
choices directly they will now determine them as the latent variables in a 
discrete-choice  model. The fact that players'  strategy  choices and best replies 
are naturally  ordered  by their payoff  implications  suggests  modeling  them as an 
ordered  probit  (see for example  McFadden  (1984)).  I therefore  assume  that the COORDINATION  GAMES  127 
vit  are conditionally  normally  distributed  given x-'1,  and that players'  choices 
among  the feasible discrete alternatives  are determined  by rounding  the latent 
variables that represent their beliefs as described below. These assumptions 
determine  players'  choice probabilities  as functions  of the nonrandom  compo- 
nents of their latent variables. 
Let players  choose, as in VHBB's experiments,  among  seven pure strategies, 
numbered  1, ... ,7. I assume that player i's choice at time t is determined  by 
rounding  xi, to the nearest  feasible strategy,  so that he chooses strategy  1 when 
X., < 3/2;  strategy  x, for x = 2,... ,6, when x -  1/2  <xi,  < x + 1/2;  and strat- 
egy 7 when  13/2  <xi.  27  Conditional on  xt_l,  eit  is normal with mean  0 and 
variance  (computed  from (4)) 
(27)  OtIxt1  =-1+2(yt1-xit1)Kt  + (Yt-1  xit-1)  O2t2 
Thus, letting c[  denote the standard  normal  distribution  function, at time t 
player  i  chooses  strategy  1  with  probability  P[(3/2  -  at -  it  Yt_-1  -  (1 - 
8t)xit - 1)1(of;it  Ixt  - 1)]; strategy x, for x = 2, ...  ,6,  with probability 
P[(X + 1/2 -at  -,t  yty1 -(1 -t)xit  -  /(0f0t  xt_1)] 
-[(x  -1/2  -  at -,8tyt-  1-  (1  -8t)xit  x 
and  strategy  7  with  probability  1 -  P[(13/2  -  at -  ,tyt-1  -  (1 -  Bt)xit-,)l 
(0ot Ixt-  1)1. 
The evolution of players'  beliefs can be described  by (5) and (6) as before, 
with players'  strategy  choices determined  by rounding  the xit, yt computed  by 
evaluating  f(*) at those rounded  values, and the Vit  satisfying  the distributional 
assumptions  in Section  3. The dynamics  are still a Markov  process  with the state 
vector xt  representing  players'  beliefs; the only difference is in how players' 
beliefs determine  their strategy  choices and the summary  statistic.  To see how 
this difference  affects the results, let h(x1t,...,  xnt)  _  *  nt,  x),  where xit 
denotes the rounded value of  xit, so that h(-)  determines the value of the 
summary  statistic that players observe as a function of their beliefs. Because 
h(a + bxlt,.. ., a + bXnt)  = a + bh(x10 ...  X  xnt) only by coincidence,  Proposition 
1 does not carry  over directly  to the present model. I now argue,  however,  that 
Propositions  2, 3, and 4-which  do not depend on Proposition  1-continue  to 
hold exactly  as stated with discrete  strategy  choice, and that Propositions  5 and 
6-which  do depend on Proposition  1-hold  approximately  whenever  the grid 
of feasible strategies  is sufficiently  fine. 
The proof of Proposition  2 goes through  because the xit remain  continuously 
variable  and yt-1, the only variable  in (6) that is affected  by rounding,  cancels 
27It would be easy to allow other values for the boundaries of these choice regions, or to estimate 
them. But rounding this way is optimal for the payoffs in most of VHBB's treatments when players 
are risk-neutral and xit is viewed as player i's estimate of  Et -.1(yt  Ixt .1), and allowing other values 
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out of the Lyapunov  function  in (10). Thus,  under  the stated  variance  conditions 
and bounds on the It,, players'  beliefs and strategy  choices still converge  with 
probability  one to one of the pure-strategy  equilibria  of the game.  The proofs  of 
Propositions  3 and 4 also go through,  because h(*) inherits  the weak monotonic- 
ity properties  of f(  ). Thus, the qualitative  comparative  dynamics  are unaltered 
by discrete  choice. 
Discrete choice does affect the quantitative  comparative  dynamics.  Proposi- 
tion 1, and thus Propositions  5 and 6, remain  formally  valid,  with the conditional 
distributions  of  the  vi,  adjusted for discreteness and  , ot-  72,  Yet,  and  8st 
evaluated  accordingly.  The difficulty  of evaluating  those parameters  limits the 
usefulness of these results. It is more helpful to identify settings in which the 
means and variances  for the model with continuously  variable strategies are 
good approximations  to their analogs  with discrete  choice. 
Plainly, the errors in approximating  the means and variances in this way 
cannot be negligible unless the probability  of significant  boundary  effects is 
negligible.28  Given this, the errors are negligible  whenever  the grid of feasible 
strategies  is sufficiently  fine. To see this, note that rounding  the xit can alter 
their order  only by creating  ties, which  does not affect  order statistics.  It follows 
that if f(Q) is an order statistic, then h(x1t,...,  xnt) equals the rounded value of 
f(xlt,....  xnt);  and  if  f(-)  is  a  convex  combination  of  order  statistics,  then 
h(x1t,...,  xnt) equals that combination  of the rounded values of those order 
statistics,  rounded as necessary  when yt is also required  to be discrete. Thus, 
the effects of rounding  in (5) and (6) are filtered through yt, bounded by half 
the size of the grid each period, and additive across periods. It can then be 
shown,  using  the fact that the convergence  of the xit is asymptotically  geometric 
in both models,  that the cumulative  effect of rounding  on yt remains  finite  with 
probability  one and approaches  zero with the size of the grid.  The quality  of the 
approximations  reported  in Crawford  (1992) suggests  that the grids  in VHBB's 
experiments  were fine enough  to make the effects  of the discreteness  negligible. 
This section's  analysis  shows that most of the theoretical  problems  caused  by 
discrete strategy spaces can be  overcome for the present model. It would, 
however, be  significantly  easier to  analyze the  results of  experiments  with 
approximately  continuous  strategy  spaces. 
6. ESTIMATION 
Although  the theoretical  analysis  of Sections  4 and 5 sheds considerable  light 
on the patterns  of discrimination  among equilibria  in VHBB's experiments,  a 
full explanation  depends on the values of the parameters  left undetermined  by 
the theory. The model provides a simple specification  of the distribution  of 
28Boundary effects were a significant problem in both of VHBB's minimum treatments and, to a 
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players'  beliefs within which those parameters  can be estimated. This section 
reports  estimates  computed  using  VHBB's  experimental  data,  in preparation  for 
the analysis  of coordination  outcomes  in Section  7.29 
The  model was  estimated separately for  each of  VHBB's experimental 
treatments  that came first  in its sequence,  pooling  the data from all such runs  of 
each treatment.30  The estimates were obtained by maximum-likelihood  tech- 
niques, taking the  discreteness of  strategy choices into  account using the 
ordered  probit  model of Section  5, with the latent  variables  determined  as in (5) 
and (6) and the error  terms taken to be heteroskedastic  as in (4), conditionally 
independent  across  players,  and conditionally  normally  distributed.3' 
The model was first estimated  for each treatment  with no restrictioris  on the 
behavioral  parameters.32  Allowing  the estimates  to vary  freely over time in this 
way maximizes  the usefulness  of their plausibility  as an informal  diagnostic  and 
minimizes  the risk  of specification  bias. However,  as explained  in Section 3, the 
large number  of parameters  (5 per period minus 3) also leaves room for doubt 
about whether the  model can explain the  dynamics only through ad  hoc 
parameter  variations.  To resolve  this doubt and to provide  the structure  needed 
for beyond-sample  prediction,  the model was reestimated  for each treatment 
under the simplest  intertemporal  constraints  that appeared  to have a chance of 
not being rejected. These required that  at =  0  for  t =  1,... in  the  median 
treatments; that  t =  a  for t = 1,...  in the minimum treatments, in which at =0 
is implausible;  that f3t  =  f3 for t = 1,... in all treatments;  and that the parame- 
ters of the variance-covariance  matrix, -t, O2t,  and Kt, all decline over time like 
1/tA  for t = 1, ... in all treatments.33  Including  a0 and o_-O,  which are allowed  to 
vary independently to  reflect the mean of  players' initial beliefs and their 
different  stochastic  specification,  these constraints  reduce the number  of inde- 
29 Broseta  (1993b)  estimates  a  related  model  that  allows  for  autoregressive  conditional  het- 
eroskedasticity  in  the  idiosyncratic  components  of  subjects'  beliefs.  This  richer  intertemporal 
stochastic structure describes the data better in some respects. 
30An exception was made in including the random-pairing minimum treatment, which was always 
run following other treatments. Only the longer of the two runs in this treatment was used, to avoid 
problems with missing observations. All  other treatments were  sometimes  run first in a series and 
sometimes  later  on;  prior  experience  clearly  affected  subjects'  initial  beliefs,  making  pooling 
inadvisable.  The  two  (out  of  nine)  runs of  the  large-group minimum treatment  in which  entire 
strategy profiles were announced were omitted for similar reasons. 
31 To  make  the  computations  manageable,  the  likelihood  function  was  constructed  period  by 
period, using the xit-  1, subjects' (rounded) strategy choices from the previous period, as proxies for 
the  xit-1,  their unobservable (unrounded) beliefs.  Without this substitution, this procedure would 
yield consistent  and asymptotically efficient parameter estimates  under my assumptions. The  grid 
ap  ears to have been  sufficiently fine that the substitution made little difference to the estimates. 
2 In each  case  the  reported  estimates  are unrestricted maximum likelihood,  except that  /81 in 
treatment  Q2  was constrained to lie between  0 and 1 because  the unrestricted estimate,  1.28, was 
implausible.  In this  and a few  other  cases,  indicated  by dashes  in parentheses  in Tables  I-V,  it 
proved impossible to compute standard errors. 
33 No  cross-treatment  restrictions were  imposed,  because  the  unconstrained  estimates  suggest 
that  most  simple  restrictions  of  this  kind  would  be  rejected,  and  such  restrictions  are  neither 
suggested by the theory nor needed  for the analysis. 130  VINCENT  P.  CRAWFORD 
TABLE I 
ESTIMATES  FOR  MEDIAN  TREATMENT  F 
(54 observations each period; asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Unconstrained  Model 
t  at  l  o  eKt  7,Ct  Log L 
0  4.75  1.62  1.62  1.62  -86.7 
(0.18)  (0.37) 
1  -0.07  0.56  0.57  0.19  0.21  1.17  0.86  -  67.9 
(0.13)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
2  0.15  0.80  0.41  0.11  -0.12  0.58  0.53  -59.4 
(0.11)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
3  0.02  0.63  0.14  0.05  -0.01  0.25  0.17  -37.9 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
4  0.10  0.57  0.05  0.55  -0.16  0.22  0.18  -24.2 
(0.10)  (0.20)  (0.02)  (0.27)  (0.05) 
5  -0.10  0.48  0.04  0.50  0.14  0.20  0.14  -15.6 
(0.12)  (0.23)  (0.02)  (0.27)  (0.05) 
6  0.09  0.41  0.04  0.43  -0.04  0.12  0.05  -8.7 
(0.09)  (-)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Constrained  Model 
t  at  l  t  Kt  't  ,  Ct  Et Log Lt 
0  4.75  1.62  1.62  1.62  -334.3 
(0.18)  (0.37) 
1  0.00  0.58  0.43  0.78  -0.05  0.82  0.54 
(0.07)  (0.20)  (0.31)  (0.13) 
2  0.00  0.58  0.23  0.43  -0.03  0.61  0.47 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.07) 
3  0.00  0.58  0.17  0.30  -0.02  0.44  0.33 
(0.07)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
4  0.00  0.58  0.13  0.24  -0.01  0.30  0.22 
(0.07)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
5  0.00  0.58  0.11  0.20  -0.01  0.21  0.16 
(0.07)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
6  0.00  0.58  0.09  0.17  -0.01  0.16  0.12 
(0.07)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.02) 
pendent behavioral  parameters  to 8 in the minimum  treatments  and 7 in the 
median  treatments,  independent  of the number  of periods. 
Tables I-V  report the unconstrained  and constrained  parameter  estimates 
for the  three median treatments, F,  Q,  and ',  and the  large-group  and 
random-pairing  minimum  treatments,  A and C, with asymptotic  standard  errors 
in parentheses. Each treatment  lasted 10 periods except for treatment C, in 
which the run for which the estimates  were computed  lasted 5 periods,  but no 
estimates  are reported  for some periods  near the ends of the median  treatments 
in which there was no longer enough sample  variation  to identify  the parame- 
ters. To avoid specification  bias, the constrained  estimates for treatment A 
were computed omitting the data from period 9, in which the unconstrained 
estimates revealed large end-of-treatment  effects, described below. The esti- 
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TABLE II 
ESTIMATES  FOR  MEDIAN  TREATMENT  Q2 
(27 observations each period; asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Unconstrained  Model 
,2t  on2  ,2t  0,2  t  oat  l  0,  0  t  Kt  a;,  Log L 
0  6.26  2.37  -  2.37  2.37  -35.9 
(0.36)  (1.04)  - 
1  0.34  1.00  1.47  2.47  -1.90  7.00  7.00  -  25.8 
(0.30)  (-)  (0.87)  (1.73)  (1.16)  - 
2  -0.16  0.95  0.04  0.15  0.04  1.08  1.06  -12.0 
(0.22)  (0.18)  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.15)  - 
3  -0.01  0.97  0.02  0.03  -0.03  0.05  0.05  -0.2 
(0.36)  (0.44)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.88)  - 
Constrained  Model 
t  ao  t  lot  I  Kt  t  K,tt  Et  Log Lt 
0  6.26  2.37  2.37  2.37  -76.5 
(0.36)  (1.04)  - 
1  0.00  0.97  0.89  0.90  0.54  2.91  2.91 
(0.13)  (0.41)  (0.64)  (0.60)  - 
2  0.00  0.97  0.09  0.09  0.06  0.35  0.35 
(0.13)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  - 
3  0.00  0.97  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.03 
(0.13)  (0.16)  (0.02)  (0.01)  - 
TABLE III 
ESTIMATES  FOR  MEDIAN  TREATMENT  ' 
(27 observations each period; asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Unconstrained  Model 
2,  2  ,2  2  t  o  lo  0a  0t  Kt  t  UZ  t  Log L 
0  4.71  0.97  -  0.97  0.97  -38.5 
(0.20)  (0.30)  - 
1  -0.30  0.95  0.22  0.07  0.09  0.29  0.29  -  23.6 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  - 
2  0.11  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.00  -4.5 
(-)  (-)  (1.13)  (0.94)  (0.57)  - 
3  0.16  0.92  0.04  0.10  0.00  0.05  0.05  -5.1 
(0.18)  (0.27)  (0.04)  (-)  (  - 
Constrained  Model 
t  ozt  Pt  cet  lot  Kt  ut2  C  a;  Log Lt 
0  4.71  0.97  -  0.97  0.97  -79.9 
(0.20)  (0.30) 
1  0.00  0.74  0.22  0.16  -0.01  0.43  0.36 
(0.11)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.08)  - 
2  0.00  0.74  0.08  0.06  -0.00  0.13  0.10 
(0.11)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.03)  - 
3  0.00  0.74  0.04  0.03  -0.00  0.05  0.04 
(0.11)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  - 132  VINCENT  P.  CRAWFORD 
TABLE IV 
ESTIMATES  FOR  LARGE-GROUP  MINIMUM  TREATMENT  A 
(107 observations each period; asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Unconstrained  Model 
t  aot  P  It  Kt  Log L 
0  5.45  3.47  -180.5 
(0.19)  (0.64) 
1  0.51  0.52  1.00  0.04  -0.21  -184.1 
(0.23)  (0.09)  (0.41)  (0.03)  (-) 
2  0.10  0.34  6,85  0.75  2.08  -  170.4 
(0.41)  (0.14)  (2.69)  (0.32)  (0.93) 
3  0.27  0.54  2.96  0.48  1.01  -  154.8 
(0.25)  (0.11)  (0.98)  (0.20)  (0.45) 
4  -0.63  0.15  6.00  0.52  1.64  -  140.7 
(0.37)  (0.13)  (2.06)  (0.22)  (0.67) 
5  -0.54  0.20  1.76  0.76  1.06  -  106.3 
(0.58)  (0.25)  (1.28)  (0.27)  (0.54) 
6  0.11  0.46  1.32  1.14  1.06  -  115.5 
(0.22)  (0.22)  (0.51)  (0.45)  (0.40) 
7  -0.35  0.40  0.55  0.24  0.19  -  78.3 
(0.35)  (0.18)  (0.42)  (0.11)  (0.19) 
8  -0.49  0.11  1.17  0.39  0.59  -  80.7 
(0.25)  (0.17)  (0.40)  (0.19)  (0.24) 
9  -5.19  -4.47  26.0  37.7  30.5  -88.0 
(1.97)  (2.24)  (1.73)  (1.04)  (1.30) 
Constrained  Model 
t  at  Pt  It  Kt  Et Log Lt 
0  5.45  3.47  -1265.0 
(0.19)  (0.64) 
1  -0.27  0.25  3.05  0.59  0.91 
(0.09)  (0.04)  (0.61)  (0.14)  (0.25) 
2  -  0.27  0.25  2.34  0.45  0.69 
(0.09)  (0.04)  (0.35)  (0.09)  (0.17) 
3  -  027  0.25  2.00  0.38  0.59 
(0.09)  (0.04)  (0.27)  (0.08)  (0.14) 
4  -0.27  0.25  1.79  0.34  0.53 
(0,09)  (0.04)  (0.23)  (0.07)  (0.12) 
5  -0.27  0.25  1.64  0.32  0.49 
(0.09)  (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.06)  (0.11) 
6  -0.27  0.25  1.53  0.29  0.45 
(0.09)  (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
7  -0.27  0.25  1.44  0.28  0.43 
(0.09)  (0.04)  (0.20)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
8  -0.27  0.25  1.37  0.26  0.41 
(0.09)  (0.04)  (0.20)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
from the estimated parameters  using (23)-(25) and assuming  normality  of the 
Zit;  large boundary effects made it  impractical to  compute the  analogous 
estimates  for the minimum  treatments. 
Despite its simplicity,  the model gives a reasonably  accurate  statistical  sum- 
mary of subjects'  behavior  in all three median treatments.  The unconstrained 
parameter  estimates are generally  plausible and reasonably  stable across peri- 
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TABLE V 
ESTIMATES  FOR  RANDOM-PAIRING  MINIMUM  TREATMENT  C 
(16 observations each period; asymptotic standard errors in parentheses) 
Unconstrained  Model 
t  rat  l  ret  t  Kt  Log L 
0  4.30  17.29  -28.2 
(1.13)  (10.47) 
1  1.59  0.67  5.26  0.96  2.24  -  22.6 
(0.71)  (0.28)  (3.15)  (0.49)  (1.15) 
2  0.35  0.51  4.74  3.33  3.97  -24.2 
(0.61)  (0.65)  (2.24)  (2.87)  (2.30) 
3  1.50  1.00  9.30  9.30  9.30  -  17.0 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (6.48)  (6.48)  (6.48) 
4  0.80  0.42  6.51  0.72  2.16  -18.8 
(0.91)  (0.37)  (4.16)  (0.44)  (1.32) 
Constrained  Model 
t  aot  lo  P  Kt  Et LogLt 
0  4.30  17.29  -  119.5 
(1.13)  (11.02) 
1  1.21  0.54  8.30  1.01  2.86 
(0.44)  (0.17)  (4.89)  (0.57)  (1.68) 
2  1.21  0.54  8.04  0.98  2.77 
(0.44)  (0.17)  (2.56)  (0.35)  (0.94) 
3  1.21  0.54  7.89  0.96  2.72 
(0.44)  (0.17)  (2.64)  (0.39)  (1.00) 
4  1.21  0.54  7.79  0.95  2.68 
(0.44)  (0.17)  (3.37)  (0.49)  (1.26) 
significantly  different  from 0. The adjustment  parameters,  f3t, are significantly 
different  from 0, ranging  from around  0.5 in treatment F  to just below 1.0 in 
treatment  Q. The initial  mean, a0, is noticeably  higher  in treatment  Q2,  in which 
(unlike  in treatment  F) the cost of failing  to coordinate  on the highest  effort is 
no greater  than for lower efforts,  and the simplicity  of the payoff  function  may 
make the argument  for the highest  effort  easier to apprehend.34  However,  ao is 
not significantly  higher  in treatment  F, where higher  efforts  are also associated 
with greater  efficiency,  than in treatment P, where they are not; and the other 
at  are no higher in treatments  F and Q than in treatment P. In treatment  Q 
the  at  and  ,t  are  close  to  the  values  that  would  correspond  to  best-reply 
dynamics  if there were no dispersion,  but in the other treatments  the at  and f3t 
are significantly  different  from both fictitious  play and best-reply  dynamics. 
With minor exceptions,  the unconstrained  estimates  of the variances  ot  and 
u2  decline smoothly  toward  0 over time, except  for an upward  jump  in ay2t from 
34 Median  treatment  F combined  a common  preference  for a higher  median,  other things  equal, 
with increasingly  severe penalties for being further  and further  away from the median. Median 
treatment  '  maintained  these penalties  while eliminating  the preference  for a higher  median;  and 
median treatment Q2  maintained  the preference  for a higher median while imposing  different 
penalties  for being away  from the median,  usually  higher  than in treatment  F but independent  of 
the distance.  See VHBB (1991)  or Crawford  (1991,  Section  2) for details. 134  VINCENT  P.  CRAWFORD 
period 3 to period 4 in treatment  F. The estimated  covariances,  Kt, are almost 
all insignificantly  different  from 0. The implied  values of the ;  and o-2t  also 
decline smoothly  toward  0, except for a sharp upward  jump from period 0 to 
period 1 in treatment  12. Inspecting  the data for the periods beyond those for 
which estimates  are reported  reveals  that maximum  likelihood  estimates  of o-t 
and  2  would differ at most slightly  from 0, continuing  their generally  down- 
ward trends  and implying  a continuing  downward  trend in the zot and ait. 
The standard  errors  of both the unconstrained  and the constrained  estimates 
indicate that constraints  that rule out strategic  uncertainty,  t -7t  -  Kt -, 
would be strongly  rejected in each case. The impression  that the dispersion  of 
subjects'  beliefs diminished steadily over time created by the unconstrained 
estimates  is confirmed  by the estimates  of A, the common  rate of decline of a,,,t, 
2,  and Kt in the constrained  specification,  which  are significantly  positive  in all 
three median  treatments:  0.86 (0.34) in F, 3.27 (0.77) in Q, and 1.52 (0.53) in  1 
(standard  errors  in parentheses).  These estimates  do not fully explain  the strong 
convergence  VHBB observed  in the median treatments,  because in treatments 
F and '  they are not significantly  greater  than one as Proposition  2's variance 
condition  requires  in this case. This might reflect the fact that Proposition  2's 
condition is sufficient,  but not necessary,  or that convergence  with probability 
one is an unrealistically  stringent  criterion. 
Likelihood  ratio tests show that the constraints  cannot be rejected in treat- 
ments Q and 0,  but are strongly  rejected  in treatment  F. The X2 statistics  are 
5.3 with 10 degrees  of freedom  for treatment  Q, with p-value 0.87; 16.6  with 10 
degrees of  freedom for treatment  1, with p-value 0.08; and 67.8 with 25 
degrees of freedom for treatment F. Otherwise  the constrained  estimates are 
quite plausible,  and similar  to the unconstrained  estimates. 
The rejection  in treatment F appears  to be due to the upward  jump in the 
dispersion  of players'  responses from period 3 to period 4, which is likely to 
violate any simple intertemporal  restrictions.  As the rejected constraints  are 
neither an implication  nor a necessary  part of the theory,  the rejection  has no 
bearing  on its validity.  Because  they can still be used to show  that the model can 
explain the dynamics  without ad hoc variations  in the parameters,  I have not 
tried to find alternative  constraints  that would not be rejected. 
The model does less well summarizing  subjects'  behavior in the minimum 
treatments.  The unconstrained  model yields implausible  estimates  of the trend 
and adjustment  parameters  in period 9 of the large-group  treatment, A,  in 
which significant end-of-treatment  effects were visible, with some subjects 
jumping  all the way from effort 1 to effort  7.35 The unconstrained  estimates  are 
35  These end effects  seemed  to be due to subjects'  perception  that the coordination  of the timing 
of adjustments  required  to break  out of an inefficient  equilibrium  was unlikely  to be achieved  in any 
period  other than the last;  see Crawford  (1991,  p. 57). They  were strongest  in the first  three runs  of 
treatment  A, in which  the endpoint  was announced;  but they  were visible  even in the last four  runs, 
in which  it was not announced,  perhaps  because subjects  believed  that the experimenters  or their 
partners  were habituated  to the decimal  system.  Estimates  computed  separately  for each of:  these 
regimes  did not differ  enough  to justify  reporting  them separately. COORDINATION  GAMES  135 
otherwise plausible and reasonably  stable over time. The initial mean, a0, is 
higher in treatment A than in the random-pairing  treatment,  C, and roughly 
comparable  to the initial  means estimated  for the median  treatments.  The trend 
parameters, at  for  t =  1, .. ., are usually insignificantly  different from 0  in 
treatment A and positive, often significantly  so, in treatment  C, showing  some 
tendency  to decline over time in treatment  A but no clear trend  in treatment  C. 
The trend  parameters  are systematically  higher  in treatment  C than in all other 
treatments,  suggesting  that subjects  may have corrected  for the fact that their 
current  pair minimum  tends to underestimate  the median  of the other subjects' 
efforts that determined their best replies (see footnote 10). The adjustment 
parameters,  Pt, are usually significantly  positive in treatment A  and positive, 
often significantly  so,  in  treatment C.  In  each case the  at  and Pt  differ 
significantly  from the values implied  by fictitious  play and best-reply  dynamics.36 
In both minimum  treatments  the unconstrained  model yields estimates  of the 
variance  parameters  that show only a weak tendency  to decline over time, with 
several  upward  jumps in the estimated  values of the a2t and  2 . This impres- 
sion  is  confirmed by the  constrained estimates of  A, the  rate of  decline 
(standard  errors  in parentheses):  0.39 (0.11) in treatment A, significantly  posi- 
tive but smaller  than in the median treatments;  and 0.05 (0.59) in treatment  C, 
insignificantly  positive. The convergence  observed  in treatment A is explained 
in Section 7 by considerations  other than those addressed  by Proposition  2, so 
the fact that its estimated A is significantly  less than 1 is no cause for concern. 
The much smaller rate of decline in treatment C reflects its extremely  slow 
convergence,  which was to be expected, given the very noisy information  its 
subjects received about the  population median that determined their best 
replies (see footnote 11). 
The unconstrained  estimates of the Kt  are generally  positive, usually  signifi- 
cantly so,  in  treatment A  and positive, but generally insignificantly  so,  in 
treatment C, as in the median treatments.  The fact that the estimated  covari- 
ances are significantly  different from zero only in the large-group  minimum 
treatment  has a plausible  explanation.  Because all subjects  are trying  to forecast 
the same summary  statistic based on the same experience, high values of  sit 
tend to be associated  with high  values of wit  in treatment  A, where the relevant 
summary  statistic  is the minimum,  so that the typical  subject's  effort is above it, 
and yt  -1  - xit-1  < 0 in (4). In the other treatments,  by contrast,  the relevant 
summary  statistic  is the median,  so that as many  subjects'  efforts  are above it as 
below it. 
Likelihood ratio tests show that the  constraints are strongly rejected in 
treatment A  even when the last period is omitted, but that they cannot be 
rejected  in treatment  C. The relevant x2 statistics  are 107.4  with 34 degrees of 
freedom  for treatment  A; and 17.4  with 14 degrees  of freedom  for treatment  C, 
36Boylan  and El-Gamal  (1993) analyzed  grouped data from different  random-pairing  experi- 
ments, comparing  randomly  perturbed  versions  of fictitious  play and best-reply  dynamics.  On the 
assumption  that subjects'  unperturbed  responses  all followed  either  one or the other of these rules, 
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with p-value 0.24. The constrained  estimates  otherwise  seem plausible,  and are 
generally  quite close to the unconstrained  estimates. 
Inspecting  the unconstrained  estimates suggests that the rejection in treat- 
ment A is again due to upward  jumps in the dispersion  of subjects'  responses, 
which  are likely  to violate any simple  intertemporal  restrictions.  As in treatment 
F, this has no bearing  on the validity  of the theory,  and I shall use the rejected 
constraints  as simplifying  restrictions  to show that the model can explain the 
dynamics  without  ad hoc parameter  variations. 
7.  COORDINATION  OUTCOMES 
The parameter  estimates  can be used to infer the probability  distributions  of 
coordination  outcomes from the results of a limited number of experimental 
trials.  Those distributions  can be approximated  analytically  as in Section 4, but 
they can be  estimated precisely only by repeated simulation. This section 
describes  simulations  based on the constrained  parameter  estimates  reported  in 
Section  6 and uses the resulting  estimated  distributions  to flesh out the explana- 
tion of VHBB's results  outlined in Section 4. 
The estimated  distributions  play an essential  role in evaluating  the model. As 
explained in Section 3, the model can explain the dynamics  VHBB observed 
only if there are significant  differences  in players'  beliefs. Because it does not 
seem useful to  try to  explain such differences when players are otherwise 
identical, the  model treats them as  error terms within a  given stochastic 
structure,  and therefore determines a probability  distribution  over outcomes 
rather  than predicting  a particular  outcome. This inevitably  limits the model's 
goodness of fit, so that it should be  evaluated by comparing  the frequency 
distributions  from the experiments  with the probability  distributions  it implies. 
Such comparisons  can be made either conditionally  or unconditionally;  both 
kinds  of test are reported  here. The simulations  take into account  the discrete- 
ness of the rounded y, and xi,, denoted 9, and x  i.  Because 9, and the x' 
normally  approach  a common  limit except  in treatment  C, I simplify  by focusing 
on 9t in treatments  other than C. 
I begin by describing  the results of the conditional  simulations  and compar- 
isons. These were designed to estimate the conditional  probability  distribution 
of  9t in the last period for which estimates are reported, given the realized 
value of x  .37  Because the realized  value of x_  differed  across  runs  in each 
treatment,  a separate  estimate  based on 500 simulation  runs  was computed  for 
each. In order to test the model's ability to "predict"  beyond sample, these 
simulations  were based on parameter  estimates  computed  under the intertem- 
poral constraints  discussed  in Section 6 but omitting  the last period of data in 
each treatment  but A, and the last two periods  of data in treatment  A. (These 
estimates  are not reported,  but are close to the constrained  estimates  in Tables 
I-V.) 
37  To make the computations  manageable,  the x  iti1  were used as proxies  for the unobservable 
xit_i.  This appears  to have  made little difference  to the results. COORDINATION  GAMES  137 
In all twelve experiments  with median games and all seven experiments  with 
treatment A, the model assigns  conditional  probability  of at least 0.998, given 
the realized  value of x  1',  to the value of 9, realized  in the last period.38  These 
fits are so close that formal tests are unnecessary.  In the experiment  with 
treatment  C considered  here the model assigns  conditional  probability  0.37 to 6, 
the  realized last-period median (the  relevant summary  statistic here) and 
conditional  probabilities  of 0.53, 0.09, and 0.01 to the alternative  values  7, 5, and 
4.39 The x2 statistic  for a test of goodness  of fit is 1.7 with 6 degrees  of freedom, 
with p-value  0.94. (The analogous  test for the xi, is not independent  of this test. 
However,  its x2 statistic  is 3.8 with 6 degrees of freedom,  with p-value 0.70.) 
I conclude that the model conditionally  predicts the 9t well in every treat- 
ment. These are weak tests, because it is not difficult to make conditional 
predictions of variables that vary as little over time as the 9t do. But this 
weakness  is inherent  in the data set, which simply  does not allow  very powerful 
tests of this kind.40 
I now turn to the unconditional  simulations,  which  were designed  to estimate 
the prior  probability  distributions  of the  't. These simulations  were carried  out 
using  both the unconstrained  and the constrained  parameter  estimates,  with 500 
runs for each treatment. I report here only the results for the constrained 
estimates, despite the fact that the constraints  were rejected in treatments F 
and A, because they provide a more stringent  test of the model's ability to 
explain  the dynamics  and help to answer  the criticism  that it can explain  them 
only through  ad hoc variation  in its parameters.  (The simulation  results  for the 
unconstrained  estimates, which are very similar, are reported in  Crawford 
(1992).) 
Because the entire time paths of 9t are important  in discriminating  among 
alternative  explanations,  the results of these simulations  are reported for as 
many  periods  as the estimates  permitted  in each treatment.  The first  and second 
lines of the cells in Tables VI-Xa report  the actual  frequency  distributions  and 
the estimated  prior probability  distributions  of the  't. The distribution  for the 
last period should approximate  the common  limiting  distribution  of 9t and the 
xit implied by the model in each treatment  but C, in which convergence  was 
slow. Table Xb supplements  the results for the 9t in treatment  C reported in 
Table Xa with the analogous  distributions  for the xit. 
38All  500 runs  yielded  the realized  median  or minimum  in all but one r and one Q2  experiment, 
in which  all but one of 500 runs  yielded  the realized  median. 
39Ambiguities  of the median  due to the evenness  of n in treatment  C were resolved  by splitting 
the weight  of ambiguous  observations  between  the two possible  values. 
40 Breaking  the sample  earlier  and trying  to predict  longer  histories  of the Yt  would  yield little 
additional  information  because the Yt do not change much even in the early periods,  and would 
make  it even more difficult  to estimate  the intertemporal  relationships  required  for beyond-sample 
prediction.  Comparing  conditional  predictions  of the  xit  with the experimental  results in the 
treatments  other than C would  amount  to a joint test of the model's  ability  to conditionally  predict 
the jt, which has already  been tested, and the assumption  maintained  in the simulations  that the 
(unrounded)  xit are conditionally  normally  distributed,  which  is a working  hypothesis  rather  than a 
substantive  implication  of the model. (Inspecting  the data nevertheless  suggests  that conditional 
normality  is approximately  satisfied.) 138  VINCENT  P.  CRAWFORD 
TABLE VI 
DYNAMICS  OF 
' 
IN MEDIAN  TREATMENT  F 
(actual frequency distributions in first lines, 
simulated frequency distributions in second lines) 
Po  P,  92  93  94  95  96 
7  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.06  0.09  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11 
5  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
0.62  0.56  0.53  0.52  0.53  0.52  0.52 
4  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
0.31  0.31  0.33  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32 
3  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.01  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
The coarseness of experimental  frequency  distributions  based on 1-7  trials 
makes them unlikely to resemble the probability  distributions  implied by the 
model closely. Formal tests suggest, however, that the model replicates the 
dynamics  in every treatment.  The most informative  tests appear  to be x2 tests 
of goodness  of fit comparing  the estimated  prior  distributions  for the last-period 
At with the corresponding  experimental  frequency  distributions,  because it is 
harder to  track the prior distributions  for the last period than for earlier 
TABLE VII 
DYNAMICS  OF 
A 
IN MEDIAN  TREATMENT  Q2 
(actual frequency distributions in first lines, 
simulated frequency distributions in second lines) 
PO  Pi  92  93 
7  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67 
0.34  0.37  0.36  0.36 
6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.55  0.47  0.47  0.47 
5  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33 
0.10  0.15  0.15  0.15 
4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
3  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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TABLE VIII 
DYNAMICS  OF  Y  IN  MEDIAN  TREATMENT  'P 
(actual frequency distributions in first lines, 
simulated frequency distributions in second lines) 
Yo  Yi  Y2  Y3 
7  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05 
5  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67 
0.68  0.66  0.66  0.66 
4  0.33  0.33  0.33  0.33 
0.28  0.29  0.29  0.29 
3  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
TABLE IX 
DYNAMICS  OF  Y  IN LARGE-GROUP  MINIMUM  TREATMENT  A 
(actual frequency distributions in first lines, 
simulated frequency distributions in second lines) 
Y0  pi  Y2  P3  Y4  Y5 
7  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
5  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
4  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.09  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
3  0.14  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.37  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2  0.29  0.57  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.33  0.18  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00 
1  0.29  0.43  0.57  1.00  1.00  1.00 
0.21  0.78  0.96  0.99  1.00  1.00 
periods.41 These tests never reject in any treatment.  The relevant  x2 statistics, 
each with six degrees of freedom, are 2.54 in treatment C, with p-value 0.86; 
0.00 in treatment A; 1.55 in treatment  F, with p-value 0.95; 2.95 in treatment 
Q,  with  p-value 0.81; and 0.16 in  treatment  1,  with  p-value 0.99. (The 
41 More  powerful  tests  involve  entire  histories  of  Yt and/or  xi,.  These  are  complicated  by 
statistical dependence,  and the results suggest that rejection is unlikely. 140  VINCENT  P.  CRAWFORD 
TABLE  Xa 
DYNAMICS  OF  Yt  IN  RANDOM-PAIRING  MINIMUM  TREATMENT  C 
(actual  frequency  distributions  in first  lines, 
simulated  frequency  distributions  in second  lines) 
Y0  Y1  92  93  Y4 
7  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
0.06  0.09  0.18  0.30  0.38 
6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
0.14  0.21  0.26  0.27  0.28 
5  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00 
0.25  0.29  0.28  0.26  0.22 
4  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.29  0.27  0.21  0.14  0.10 
3  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.19  0.11  0.06  0.04  0.01 
2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.08  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00 
1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
analogous  tests for earlier periods and/or the unconstrained  estimates,  which 
are not independent,  would yield the same conclusions,  with the exception of 
the constrained  estimates for period 2 in treatment A.) The model replicates 
the unconditional  frequency  distributions  from VHBB's experiments. 
The statistical  analysis  suggests  that VHBB's results  were not anomalous.  In 
some cases, however,  the model strengthens  or modifies  the impressions  created 
by the raw data. The inefficient  outcomes they observed  in treatment A now 
appear inevitable,  appearing  in all 500 simulation  runs. It appears, however, 
TABLE  Xb 
DYNAMICS  OF THE  Xit  IN RANDOM-PAIRING  MINIMUM  TREATMENT  C 
(actual  frequency  distributions  in first  lines, 
simulated  frequency  distributions  in second  lines) 
iio  iXj  Xi2  Xi3  ii4 
7  0.31  0.31  0.25  0.63  0.50 
0.30  0.33  0.37  0.42  0.46 
6  0.00  0.06  0.19  0.00  0.00 
0.09  0.09  0.10  0.11  0.11 
5  0.13  0.31  0.19  0.19  0.25 
0.09  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.10 
4  0.19  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
0.09  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.09 
3  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.00 
0.09  0.10  0.10  0.08  0.07 
2  0.06  0.06  0.13  0.13  0.13 
0.08  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.05 
1  0.25  0.13  0.13  0.00  0.06 
0.25  0.20  0.16  0.13  0.12 COORDINATION  GAMES  141 
that players  might  do better than VHBB's  subjects  in treatment  F, and worse in 
treatment Q. The model also suggests somewhat  more strongly  than the data 
that treatment  C is likely to yield a high-effort  equilibrium. 
The model attributes  the complete  lack  of history-dependence  in treatment  A 
to the strongly  negative  drift in this treatment,  which overwhelmed  its variance 
so that the lower bound on players' strategies determined  the final outcome 
with high probability.  The strong  history-dependence  in the median treatments 
and the moderate  history-dependence  in treatment  C can be traced to the low 
to moderate drifts in these treatments,  the large conditional  variances  of y, in 
treatment C, and the small conditional  variances of  y,  in the median treat- 
ments. The analysis suggests, however, that the perfect history-dependence 
VHBB observed  in all twelve  of their experiments  with median  games  overstates 
the importance  of historical  accidents  in such environments.  In the simulation 
results the correlation  between yO and the last yt reported is only 0.68 in 
treatment r,  0.76 in treatment (2, and 0.90 in treatment 1, so that the initial 
median "explains"  only 46%, 58%, and 81% of the variances  of the limiting 
outcomes in these treatments. 
8.  CONCLUSION 
The model provides  a simple,  unified  explanation  for the complex  patterns  of 
history-dependence  and discrimination  among equilibria in VHBB's experi- 
ments. Three directions  for further  research  seem promising. 
It would be desirable to conduct similar experiments,  in order to test the 
theory's  predictions  beyond the samples  that influenced  its specification,  and to 
learn more about how the strategic environment  influences the dispersion  of 
players' beliefs and the  rate at which it  is  eliminated as they accumulate 
forecasting  experience. 
It would also be of interest to relax the assumption  that players'  beliefs and 
strategy  choices are statistically  identical  ex ante. The substance  of this assump- 
tion is the absence of externally  observable  differences  between players.  It may 
be  tractable to allow, instead, a fixed population made up of two or more 
observable "types" of  players, with each player's payoffs and best  replies 
determined in  each play by his type, his strategy choice, and the  current 
population  distribution  of strategy  choices by type. A random-pairing  model in 
which  players'  types are identified  with their roles in a "divide-the-dollar"  game, 
as in Young (1993b), seems of particular  interest. Such a model, in which 
players'  preferences  over equilibria  are opposed, is a natural  complement  to the 
present analysis  and may help in interpreting  experimental  evidence  on bargain- 
ing outcomes  (see Roth (1987)). 
Finally,  it would be of interest to extend the analysis  from tacit coordination, 
in which  players  communicate  only by playing  the game, to explicit  coordination, 
in which players  can send signals  that are not directly  related to the game (and 
which may not be costly). Tacit coordination  raises many issues that must be 
resolved to understand  explicit coordination,  and generalizing  the techniques 
developed here may yield useful models of  explicit coordination.  A  natural 142  VINCENT  P.  CRAWFORD 
place to begin is games with one or more rounds of costless, simultaneous 
pre-play  communication  (see Farrell  (1987), Palfrey  and Rosenthal  (1991), and 
Crawford  (1990)) or the games with costly pre-play communication  used in 
VHBB's (1993) experiments  (see Crawford  and Broseta (1994)). Considering 
how the meanings  of players'  messages and their decisions evolve may resolve 
the ambiguity  that plagues traditional  analyses  of preplay  communication  and 
shed new light on proposed  equilibrium  refinements. 
Dept. of Economics,  University  of California,  San Diego, 9500 Gilman  Dr., La 
Jolla, CA 92093-0508,  U.S.A. 
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